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SS Chief Heinrich Himmler
Speech
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Heinrich Himmler was the master
architect of Adolf Hitler's racial
state and the founder of the SS:
Nazi Germany's elite fighting force
which functioned also as Hitler's
Praetorian Guard.
The son of a devout Catholic
schoolmaster, Himmler begins his
career as a poultry farmer after
having received a diploma in the
study of agriculture. Too young to
serve in World War I, he later joins
the Reichskriegsflagge and takes
part in Hitler's 1923 Beer Hall
Putsch. Himmler joins the Nazi Party
in 1925 becoming one of Hitler's
earliest followers. Thereafter,
Himmler's organizational talents
catches Hitler's eye and he rises
rapidly up the party ranks.
As Nazi party police chief, Himmler
devotes himself to creating the
Schutzstaffel (SS) which serves as
Hitler's personal guard. With
Hitler's ascension to power in
January 1933, Himmler is appointed
Munich Chief of Police and in that
capacity establishes Nazi Germany's
first concentration camp at Dachau.
In 1934, Hitler promotes him to
Gestapo police chief for Prussia -
On June 30, 1934, Hitler gives
Himmler and his SS force the green
light to massacre the faggot leader
of the SA Roehm in the night of the
long knives.
Himmler presided over the organized
network of concentration camps that
dotted the landscape of occupied
Europe.
World War II greatly increases
Himmler's already vast powers as the
elite SS grows into an army of 35
divisions, loyal to Hitler unto
death. As Hitler's empire grows, he
appoints Himmler Commissioner for
the Consolidation of German
Nationhood which makes him
responsible for policing all of
occupied Europe.
In that position he overseeed the
removal of millions of racial
criminals and their internment into
forced labor camps that manufacture
arms and goods for the German war
effort.
May 1945 durning the last days of
the war, Himmler attempts to escape
disguised as a painter but is caught
by the British Army. He commits
suicide by biting down on a cyanide
capsule.
Speech of Reichsführer SS Heinrich
Himmler
at Posen 4 - 10/43
In the months which have past since
we last met in June of 1942, many
comrades have fallen and given their
lives for Germany and for the
Führer. Before them, in the
forefront -- I ask you to stand in
their honour, and in the honour of
all our dead SS men and dead German
soldiers, men and women -- in the
forefront, from our ranks, "let us
honour" our old comrade and friend,
SS Obergruppenführer Eicke
The situation in the fifth year of
the war
I have considered it necessary to
call you all together, the High
Leadership Corps of the SS and
Police, now at the beginning of the
fifth year of the war, which will be
a very difficult year of the war.
Hard-headed, as we always were, in a
spirit of respect for the truth with
regards to ourselves, there are
several things which we wish to
discuss at this Troop Leadership
Conference. Just as I was accustomed
to do in long years of peace, I wish
to describe the situation as I see
it, in as few words as possible,
with regards to our responsibilities
and that which we have already
achieved and accomplished, as well
as with regards to that which stands
before us to be accomplished in the
future.
The Russian leadership
First, the military situation. I
will begin with Russia. When -- I
believe it was in 1937 or 1938 --
the great show trials were being
held in Moscow, and the ex-Czarist
officer and later Bolshevik general
Tuchachevski and other generals were
shot, we were, at that time, all
over Europe, even in the Party and
the SS, of the opinion that the
Bolshevik system, and therefore
Stalin, had made one of its most
serious mistakes. We were absolutely
mistaken in this judgment of the
situation. We can state this, once
and for all, in a spirit of full
respect for the truth. I believe
that Russia could not have withstood
the two years of war -- it is now in
the third year of war -- had it
retained its ex-Czarist generals. It
turned -- I'll discuss this first of
all -- its political commissars into
generals, it sought out those who
had grown up through the Red Army as
commanders, as generals, so that
they could simultaneously act as
political commissars. The
stubbornest bearers of the will of
the Bolshevik... doctrine, I should
like to call it, not an ideology ...
is, in Russia, simultaneously a
commander and leader.
The Attack of 1941
In 1941, the Führer attacked Russia.
That was, as we may well say today,
shortly, perhaps a quarter or half
year before Stalin's enveloping
movement prior to his great thrust
into Central and Western Europe. I
can sketch out this first year with
very brief strokes. The attack was
effective. The Russian army was
driven together into great pockets,
destroyed, taken prisoner. We did
not then value the mass man as we do
now, as raw material, as manpower.
Which is not a shame in the end, if
one thinks in terms of generations,
but it is regrettable today due to
the loss of manpower: the prisoners
died by the tens of thousands or
hundreds of thousands from
exhaustion, from hunger.
The winter of 1941-1942
Then came the summer and autumn
of 1941, the flush of victory which
led us almost to Moscow, the winter
of 1941-42. The winter of 1941-42,
with its consequences, was, on the
one hand, the work of Fate, which
hit us hard for the first time; on
the other hand, however, it was the
work of the political commissars,
the "politruks", whose severity and
relentlessness, whose fanatical,
brutal will drove the raw material
of the Slavic, Mongolian mass man to
the front, and didn't let him get
back out again.
The year 1942
In early 1942 then came our attacks
in the Crimea, over the Donetz to
the Don and to the Volga. The bow of
the German front and its allies was
drawn taut. The war could have been
brought to a close for Russia in
1942 if all had held out. Since
according to all calculations, and
in all probability, which must not
be left out of consideration in war,
with which one must still reckon
after all, the Caucasus would have
fallen into our hands sooner or
later.
Russia would have been cut off from
its chief sources of petroleum, and
hunger would have handled its people
even more roughly than is the case
today. Then came the collapse of our
allies. First came the breakthrough
among the Rumanians, then the
breakthrough among the Italian Army,
which was already of very little
value even then, then the
breakthrough and retreat of the
Hungarian units: the total loss of
approximately 500 km of front. This
loss required the withdrawal of the
German front, in order to be able to
close it again at all. This loss
made the sacrifice of Stalingrad
necessary from the point of view of
Fate. It is not our intention to
reflect upon every detail here
today. I am personally convinced
that this sacrifice -- that sounds
dreadfully harsh when I say so now
-- was necessary, since, without the
link-up of enemy forces around
Stalingrad, it would no longer have
been possible to close the German
front. That will, I am convinced, be
the finding of military historical
research 10, 15, or 20 years after
the war. At the same time, a very
late consolation.
The year 1943.
The first great battle for Kharkhov
then came early this year. Kharkhov
was evacuated under sometimes --
this is known to every one of our
units out there -- very peculiar
circumstances. At the right time,
then, upon the order of the Führer,
the tank corps arrived in Kharkhov
under the leadership of our old
comrade, SS Obergruppenführer
Hausser. The deliberate evacuation
of Kharkhov was also carried out by
Hausser using the tank corps. A
glorious campaign of several weeks
then began, carried out by this
corps in an unusually mobile manner
in the open field, a manner I
consider truly correct and downright
true to type for motorized and tank
units. Our tank corps drove the
enemy; Sepp Dietrich was the first
to break into Kharkhov with his
Leibstandarte. Kharkhov was retaken,
and the German front was
re-established.
In late spring and summer of this
year, we replied to the attacks of
the Russians with a big
counterattack at Bielgorod. We can
report with pride that the only
corps which really penetrated the
deeply entrenched system of Russian
positions was our SS Tank Division,
with the Standarte "Deutschland" in
front of the old Division "Das
Reich". The Russians had built a
position 7 km deep, a model and an
example such as we Germans ought
never to forget: to work hard, to
dig in, and build positions. Because
the hard work, the sweat poured out
in so doing, will save the lives of
tens of thousands. We Germans have
still not really learned this after
four years of war. If we had to give
a grade for this like in school, the
best the Germans could get for
building their positions would be
between 4 and 5 "i.e., D or F". I
must acknowledge one thing here: our
SS Divisions have learned a great
deal over the past 2 years, and
generally build their positions very
assiduously.
In the middle of this operation on
the eastern front came the necessary
withdrawal of a great number of
divisions to Italy. That was why we
could not counter as forcefully as
necessary the Russian attack, which
we could have terminated with a
catastrophe for the Russians if we
had had ten more tank divisions,
purely on the grounds of strength.
The human potential of the
Russians
Here I would like to say a few words
on evaluating the total strength of
the Russians. An element basic to an
overall evaluation is the question
of Russian population figures. That
is the great riddle. Population
estimates for that country, which
has been hermetically sealed off for
decades, range from 170 to 250
million. I have taken a lot of
trouble with this question, and have
had studies prepared starting with
the first Czarist censuses, that is,
the first censuses ever carried out
in Russia. At that time, the
Bolshevik tendency to conceal
everything from Europe and the world
-- from the building of a street
which is not indicated on any map,
to the concealment of large
industries manufacturing tanks and
airplanes, and which are shown to
the European Info-tourist as
"tractor factories", while tanks are
built in the next hall -- did not
yet exist. I had census figures
brought to me which were not
gathered under this law of
camouflage and concealment, decades
before the Bolshevik administration.
These figures enable one to perceive
a certain increase, a gradual
growth. We came to the conclusion
through our calculations that Russia
must have two hundred people, maybe
two hundred twenty million at the
very most. To describe the
calculations in detail at this time
would take too long and might also
be too boring. I came to the
conclusion that the Russians, in
addition to the divisions on their
Western front, that is, the
divisions standing directly opposite
us today, have squeezed an
additional 4 million soldiers out of
the body of their people early this
year and over the course of the
year. That means 400 times 10,000
men, or 400 new divisions. I
calculate this in approximately the
following manner: the Russians have
already drafted all men born in
1926, and some of the men born in
1927. It is a tragedy according to
the laws of nature that Russian men
born in 1925 to 1927 amount to 1.5
and 1.8 men respectively, while our
men born in the same years amount to
only 500,000 to 600,000
"respectively?", that is, a third of
the Russian number.
In addition, the Russians have no
doubt added a lot of people to their
companies by drafting even younger
men, men born in 1928. The Division
"Das Reich" reports that, in some
cases, the divisions opposing us
contained whole companies consisting
of 14 and 15 year olds. That is
entirely indifferent to the
Russians; to them, only the masses
count; the masses must be trampled,
stuck, and slaughtered. They are --
to use a really brutal expression --
like a pig which has been stuck and
must slowly bleed to death. The
Russians have doubtlessly further
reinforced their army by an
additional 1 million men through the
incorporation of auxiliary forces,
that is, chiefly women and boys in
the military and supply units,
general staffs, and as auxiliary
machine gunners. The Russians have
apparently not received any Chinese.
They have, however, recruited
another 1 million men from their
small splinter nationalities, such
as the Afghans (2 to 3 million
people), Mongols from Outer Mongolia
(2 million people), and Kirghis;
these people are perhaps not yet
exhausted in terms of military
purposes. I believe that all in all
they have raised another 4 million
men for their offensive army.
With regards to the situation as a
whole, I am, as you know, an
optimist. I know that we will win
the war. That is a law of nature.
But I have always been rather
conservative in my calculations, and
I think I can show that I have never
made a mistaken prophecy in these
matters. I therefore believe that
the Russians have lost approximately
2 million men in dead, prisoners,
and disabled. We must therefore
expect one more desperate total
offensive of the Russians in winter,
with a strength of 200 divisions,
that is, approximately 2 million
men. We must and will hold off this
attack and this clash.
Absolutely nothing is endless on
this earth; the potential of the
Russians is not endless either. When
these Brussilov offensives, to use
the expression, are finally over,
the potential of the Russians will
therefore be approaching its natural
end. Hunger is a serious problem
among the Russians. It is
interesting that the Russians
consider it correct, with the mass
man, to keep the officers and
commissars physically strong and in
a good mood by feeding them an
American diet, while little Ivan is
fed very shabbily with a bit of
bread or similar rubbish. They are
fighting the whole war through their
brutally trained leadership strata
of political officers;
officer-comissars or
commissar-officers; politruks or
subordinate officers; subordinate
officers or politruks; it has
gradually come to be all one and the
same.
The partisan war
Now I come to another aspect of the
war in Russia, of which there is so
frightfully much talk. When you
arrive in the East, in the high
staff headquarters, a map on a scale
of 1 to 1 million is usually spread
out in front of you. Every mine
found on a certain date anywhere
along railroad tracks thousands of
kilometres long is diligently
entered with a squiggle on this map
on a scale of 1 to 1 million. Every
attack, whether an attack on a
munitions transport or a cattle
theft usual in the district, is
entered with a cross or something
similar. The result is that a map
like that looks all red.
You're tempted to say: "It's
hopeless! Give up! There's nothing
we can do". But if you transfer the
same data to a map on a normal
scale, and compare it to the
criminal cases in our sheltered
German fatherland, still richly
supplied with policemen even today,
then it sinks to an unpleasant minor
matter. But they all tell you -- if
you will listen to it -- all the
lowest ranking staff members,
especially in the communications
zone, "It's dreadful! The Central
Army Group is cut off from the
fatherland for 400 kilometres by a
belt of partisans."
When somebody tells you that, just
hand him your hanky so he can dry
his tears. I always ask such people
the question: "Has the Central Army
Group suffered from hunger so far?"
Answer: "No." "Has their ammunition
been cut off?" "No, they've received
everything." Of course, the trains
are delayed for hours, half a day.
"Have their supplies been
interrupted then?" "No, the Army
Group is receiving its supplies."
The Vlasov ballyhoo
Then you hear the next prayer. This
goes: "We were wrong about the
Russians." This song is usually sung
by men from some Eastern province,
who were over there in their youth,
some of whom have written very good
books and had a Russian mother, too,
and now they tell stories. It is
also sung by the little political
vagabonds whom we first came to know
in the eastern struggle against
Poland, whom we rejected at home,
and who have now been drafted as
soldiers, officers and majors, and
are still peddling their
intellectual poison under cover of
the uniform of our decent German
army. Goaded on by this propaganda
tendency -- I can't call it anything
else -- they tell you so many
stories, or write them home by
military post (and the stories then
trickle down from top to bottom):
"Yes, we were wrong about the
Russians. The Russians are not at
all the robot" (this is the
expression used most frequently)
"that we thought they were in 1941.
Now that we're over here in the
East, our eyes have been opened. The
Russians are a noble people, and so
on and so forth, a collection of all
virtues. We just have to educate
them as National Socialists, the
best thing would be to create a
NSRAP or something similar. Then
they would" -- this is the next bit
-- "form the army of liberation
under General Vlasov". Then comes
the following, which is a constant
claim of General Vlasov: "Russia can
only be freed by Russians. Germany
has so far never been able to defeat
the Russians". So give Vlasov
500,000 or 1,000,000 Russians, arm
them well, train them insofar as
possible according to German
principles, and Vlasov is so noble,
that he'll go off against the
Russians and kill them for us.
People can blow off a great deal of
stuff and nonsense; that wouldn't be
so dangerous. But when a piece of
nonsense like this has the end
effect that a glorious army, looking
back on hundreds of years of
tradition like the German one,
begins to doubt its own strength due
to the gossip of politically
untrained little officers of higher
or lower service grades -- the
little bundle of proverbs who talks
like this doesn't even notice how
devastating it is when he says: "We
cannot beat the Russians, they can
only do that themselves" -- then
that is dangerous.
Everybody you ask, "How's the
Russian infantry?", will tell you,
with pathetic thoughtlessness (since
the two things don't go together
logically, after all): "The Russian
infantry is garbage. We are vastly
superior to them." But: Russians can
only be defeated by Russians.
I wouldn't have had any objections,
if we had hired Mr. Vlasov and every
other Slavic subject wearing a
Russian general's uniform, to make
propaganda against the Russians. I
wouldn't have any objections at all.
Wonderful.
Brig. Fegelein and the Russian
general
Our comrade Fegelein once captured a
Russian general like that. Look,
they're cheap. They're Slavs. Full
of humour, as Fegelein is, Fegelein
told his staff: "We'll treat this
one real good. We'll act like we're
going to recognize him as a General.
So, when he comes in, stand up,
stand at attention, keep quiet, say
'General Sir, this' and 'General
Sir, that', show him how much
respect you have for him". Of
course, this worked. You don't need
to give a Russian general any
political ideas, political ideals,
or political plans for the future.
You can get them cheaper than that,
gentlemen. The Slavs are known for
that.
The Slav is never able to build
anything himself. In the long run,
he's not capable of it. I'll come
back to this later.
With the exception of a few
phenomena produced by Asia every
couple of centuries, through that
mixture of two heredities which may
be fortunate for Asia but is
unfortunate for us Europeans -- with
the exception, therefore, of an
Attilla, a Ghenghis Khan, a
Tamerlaine, a Lenin, a Stalin -- the
mixed race of the Slavs is based on
a sub-race with a few drops of blood
of our blood, blood of a leading
race; the Slav is unable to control
himself and create order. He is able
to argue, able to debate, able to
disintegrate, able to offer
resistance against every authority
and to revolt. But these human
shoddy goods are just as incapable
of maintaining order today as they
were 700 or 800 years ago, when they
called in the Varangians, when they
called in the Ruriks "Vikings called
in to settle Russia".
Every Russian, every Slav, likes to
hear himself talk. An old story. If
you encourage them: "Please tell us,
we place the highest value on your
opinion. After all, we can only
learn from you", then you won't find
a single Russian commissar who won't
fall for this; it's like tickling
them with a peacock feather, just
like this. Our Fegelein treated his
general that way, and his general
told us everything that such a
brave, courageous commander really
shouldn't ever tell at all,
everything from his battery
positions to his divisional marching
plans and orders (he had a whole
offensive army). He gave us
everything ripe for the slaughter.
It was clear in his mind that after
all his blabbering -- he was never
asked anything directly, not with a
single word -- that he really
couldn't go back to Little Father
Stalin, even though he wore the
Order of Stalin number seven hundred
and something, a sort of Great
Knight's Cross from over there,
which he then gave Fegelein as a
gift. Fegelein gave the medal to the
führer, and the führer gave it back
to Fegelein in a very nice silver
box. Just thought I'd mention it.
Vlasov again
When Fegelein told me the story of
the general, I said, "Sure, we can
do everything. The man gets promised
everything and he'll get it, too. He
gets the pension of a German
lieutenant general (he's a Russian
lieutenant general). He gets good
food, liquor, women."
That's really disgustingly cheap. A
torpedo costs, what do I know,
10,000 marks, as soon as we fire it.
The preliminary concentrated
artillery fire for a single division
or corps costs many hundreds of
thousands. We don't even know
whether the fire will be as
effective in every case as when we
buy just one cheap Russian general.
Of course, it doesn't go like that
formally; you don't say, "You get
100,000 marks down, now betray
everything to us". Of course, he
won't do it. Comrade Slav has a few
points of honour here. You have to
go about it differently.
Let's figure it out. How much
pension does he get? 1,500 marks a
month, that's 18,000 marks a year.
Let him live 10 years, that's
180,000 marks. Miscellaneous
expenditure is 20,000 marks. That's
200,000 marks total. It's really
cheap if you get a Russian offensive
army for it. You can do that with
every Russian general, every one. We
really shouldn't take them so
seriously. If we could do that, then
things would go right. But we
Germans handle it so badly, I must
say, in the state and the armed
forces, that even many a Party
comrade has walked on that bird's
lime and gotten stuck.
Mr. Vlasov has made speeches in
Paris, in Brussels, in Berlin. At
his feet sat astonished members of
the German leadership corps; their
mouths hang wide open, their noses
fall right down into their mouths
out of sheer astonishment: "Golly!
That Bolshevik can do simply
everything". And they let that
butcher's assistant tell them so. I
took the trouble to read his whole
speech once. I'll write an opinion
on this speech, and send it to you
in the near future. Mr. Vlasov says:
"It's a shame how the Germans treat
the Russian people. We Russians
abolished corporal punishment
decades ago". (Sure, they abolished
it. That's why they shoot them now
instead. That's just another kind of
incentive.) "You Germans
re-introduced corporal punishment,
oh, how barbarous, how low-down."
Everybody in the audience feels
ashamed. A few minutes later he
claims: "How nationalistic the
Russians are, you must appeal to
their nationalistic soul". Can't you
just see how the victor over Field
Marshal Paulus, General X (I no
longer recall his name), who was
locked up by the GPU for years,
beaten, whipped, and tortured, so
that he suffers from hip pain even
today and has a severe head injury,
was victorious over Paulus at
Stalingrad out of pure nationalism?
Nobody contradicts him. I thought
the Russians had abolished corporal
punishment. Apparently, among the
Russians, only the generals are
beaten, to get better results out of
them. This Vlasov ballyhoo has gone
around Germany without
contradiction. Instead of skilfully
making propaganda out of it, to
disintegrate the Russian army, this
propaganda has been turned against
us, and has to some extent paralysed
the strength of resistance and the
will to resist of our own ranks
through errors and false notions.
Ruling with a minority
I have felt obligated here to speak
of these things quite openly here,
with absolutely no rancour against
anyone. All the things that we are
still doing wrong, that we still
can't do right, that is, how to act
with regards to foreign peoples, the
domination of masses of foreign
blood by a small minority of the
upper crust, all these things just
have to be learned. We of the old
Reich, I'm speaking of little
Germany, have only been a Reich for
70 years. We have not yet had the
opportunity to rule large political
minorities, or even majorities, with
a German minority, like the Ostmark
in Old Austria, with its minority of
12 million Germans, ruling 40 to 50
million members of foreign races in
the Balkans. Nor have we had the
opportunity to learn to rule
millions, hundreds of millions, with
a minority, as England does, having
learned how for 300 years.
We must take things as they are. We
will learn that too; and if we could
rise from the dead again in 100
years, we would see that our
grandchildren and
great-grandchildren will already be
better at it than we are. I wish to
instruct the SS in all these things.
I believe that we are best protected
from error through our self-assured
racial attitude. We must also learn
a great deal ourselves. We'll do it,
I believe, to put it modestly for
once, the least badly, relatively
speaking, and with the fewest
mistakes.
Psychology of the Slavs
Now, back to the Slavs! I consider
it necessary to speak to each other
about this once again. Whether it's
Peter the Great or the late Czars,
whether it's Lenin or Stalin, they
know their own people. They are
perfectly well aware that the
concepts of "loyalty", "never
betraying", "never conspiring", have
no place in the Russian vocabulary.
Whatever people may tell you about
the Russians, it's all true. It's
true that some of the Russians are
fervently pious, and fervently
believe in the Mother of God of the
Khasans or someplace else, it's
absolutely true. It's true that the
Volga boatmen sing beautifully; it's
true that the Russian of today, in
moden times, is a good improviser
and good technician. It's true, for
the most part, that he's even a
lover of children. It's true that he
can work very hard. And it's just as
true that he is stinking lazy. It's
just as true that he is an
uninhibited beast, who can torture
and torment other people in ways a
devil would never permit himself to
think of. It's just as true that the
Russian, high or low, is inclined to
the perversest of things, even
devouring his comrades or keeping
his neighbour's liver in his lunch
bag. It's all part of the scale of
feelings and values of the Slavic
peoples. It's often purely a matter
of chance which lot he draws; and to
people who don't know the beast, he
is often a very great riddle: what
is the fellow up to now?
The Russians themselves know each
other very well, and have invented a
very practical system, whether it
was the Czars with the Ochrana, or
Mr. Lenin and Mr. Stalin with the
GPU or the NKVD. When four Russians
get together, with little father,
little mother, and their little
children, not one of the 4 or 5
knows who is betraying whom at the
moment: which one is the informer
betraying the father now: is it the
mother, or the daughter? And who, in
return, is betraying them? In
doubtful cases there may be two,
even three, informers in this
family. I am not exaggerating. This
remark is entirely accurate with
regards to the city. In the
countryside, our comrades who have
been over there in the East can
confirm that there are still 20 or
30 NKVD informers and agents in
every village, even after the
withdrawal of the Bolsheviks. This
ensures, to an absolute certainty,
that no conspiracy can get started,
because everything will still be
reported to the top by means of this
informer apparatus. Then comes the
pistol or deportation, and that is
how this entire people must be
governed.
Heart in the wrong place
It is basically wrong for us to
project our whole harmless soul and
heart, all our good nature, our
idealism, onto foreign peoples. This
applies to Herder, who wrote the
"Voices of the Peoples", probably in
a drunken hour, and caused us, in
later generations, such boundless
suffering and misery. That applies
to the Czechs and Slovenes, to whom,
after all, we brought their national
feeling. They themselves were
absolutely incapable of it; rather,
we invented it for them.
For the SS Man, one principle must
apply absolutely: we must be honest,
decent, loyal, and comradely to
members of our own blood, and to no
one else. What happens to the
Russians, the Czechs, is totally
indifferent to me. Whatever is
available to us in good blood of our
type, we will take for ourselves,
that is, we will steal their
children and bring them up with us,
if necessary. Whether other races
live well or die of hunger is only
of interest to me insofar as we need
them as slaves for our culture;
otherwise that doesn't interest me.
Whether 10,000 Russian women fall
down from exhaustion [verb:
"umfallen"] in building a tank ditch
is of interest to me only insofar as
the tank ditches are finished for
Germany.
We will never be hard and heartless
when it is not necessary; that is
clear. We Germans, the only ones in
the world with a decent attitude
towards animals, will also adopt a
decent attitude with regards to
these human animals; but it is a sin
against our own blood to worry about
them and give them ideals, so that
our sons and grandchildren will have
a harder time with them. When
somebody comes to me and says, "I
can't build tank ditches with
children "?" or women. That's
inhumane, they'll die doing it."
Then I must say: "You are a murderer
of your own blood, since, if the
tank ditches are not built, then
German soldiers will die, and they
are the sons of German mothers. That
is our blood." That is how I would
like to indoctrinate this SS, and, I
believe, have indoctrinated, as one
of the holiest laws of the future:
our concern, our duty, is to our
people, and to our blood. That is
what we must care for and think
about, work for and fight for, and
nothing else. Everything else can be
indifferent to us. I wish the SS to
face the problem of all foreign,
non-Germanic peoples, particularly
the Russians, with this attitude.
Everything else is moonshine, a
fraud against our own people, and an
obstacle to earlier victory in the
war.
Russian soldiers on our side
One thing is a matter of course in
this war: it is better for a Russian
to die than a German. If we use the
Russians, then they must be mixed
with Germans in a ratio of 1:2 to
1:3. The best thing is to use
individual Russians; then you can
drive with them in a tank. One
Russian with 2 or 3 Germans in a
tank, magnificent, nothing wrong.
But you must never let one Russian
meet other tank-driving Russians,
otherwise the boys will conspire.
But if you wish to have Russian-only
companies for some reason, then be
careful, gentlemen -- and that is
not just a thought, gentlemen, that
is an order, gentlemen -- they must
have their informer apparatus, their
NKVD, in this company. Then you can
sleep in peace. Otherwise, this is
one of the earliest warnings I've
issued, take care that these
sub-humans always look at you; they
must always look their superior in
the eye. It's like with animals. As
long as an animal looks his tamer in
the eye, he won't try anything. But
have no doubt about one thing: he is
a beast. We will able to utilize
["ausnutzen"] the Russians with this
attitude; with this attitude we
shall be superior to the Slavs at
all times. But not with any other
attitude.
The Russian theatre of war today
Now back to the military situation!
We are in a foreshortened position
today. It is a shame that we had to
give up the Donetz Basin. We have
given it up. That will in no way
decide or influence the outcome of
the war at all. It is advantageous
to us to have a short, straight
front in this way; it will be
extended, and must be extended, with
all our strength; it will then form
our East Wall with the shortest,
straightest connections to the rear.
All in all, this offers one very
great advantage. The enemy has now
regained the great area which we
previously had to conquer, large
expanses of which we seriously
damaged. I view the offensive of the
Russians this winter with calm. I am
convinced that we can hold off this
last great lunge of the desperate
beast. And then, he wouldn't be a
Slav if he didn't suddenly show
signs of very severe exhaustion, and
I mean intellectual exhaustion.
The Italian theatre of war
Now for Italy, the other theatre of
war! There must be no doubt in our
minds that the weakness of this
people lies in their blood, in their
race. In considering this problem,
we must distinguish between that
which is comfortable or
uncomfortable for us today, and that
which will be comfortable or
uncomfortable for us in the future.
Italy was a weak ally, beginning
with Greece and Africa, and ending
with Russia. There is, after all, no
nation which hasn't thrashed the
Italians, from whom the Italians
haven't taken a beating. The
Italians, we can see this right now,
will be considered the most
contemptible people in the world; no
one, no Albanian, no Montenegrin, no
Frenchman, no American, no
Englishman, no Russian, no German,
will have any respect for them,
since they have proven themselves
everywhere to be cowards, as
soldiers, as men. That is the most
contemptible judgement that one can
hand down against a people and a
race. We must therefore distinguish
between that which is comfortable
for us today and that which would be
comfortable for us in the future. If
the Italians were a neighbour truly
related to us in terms of inner
qualities, then it would be
magnificent if Italy had remained
strong. But with a consistently weak
neighbour who has no resistance to
anything, the situation as it is, I
must say, is much better. It is
considerably better. At the moment,
it is uncomfortable; it came at an
inconvenient time. If the betrayal
had come a quarter of a year later,
it would have been better for us.
But you can't hope for that in war.
Fate simply doesn't ask what you
want. It throws you heavy punches.
In the long-distant future, we will
be thankful to Fate and to God that
it happened as it did.
The failure of the Italians
I've already said that the Italians
have failed everywhere. Pantelleria,
to take only one characteristic
example, capitulated with 12,000 men
after the loss of 36 killed and 120
wounded over the course of six
weeks. They had enough water -- the
report of the honourable commander
of Pantelleria was not true -- for
the garrison of 12,000 men, probably
for another 10 to 12 days. I
personally believe they had enough
water for even longer. The island
could simply not be taken, every
expert says so; even the airplane
hangars were underground, built into
rock casemates. They simply couldn't
be gotten out of there. Something
must be said here: the surrender of
Pantelleria was tragic insofar as
the Duce consolidated the island,
exactly as he built the Italian air
force, exactly as he created the
Italian navy. That navy was his
work, his navy. But these people,
one can really say, are still
Italians after all; the Duce is the
only one who embodies and bears in
himself the great Roman tradition.
The Italian army in Sicily didn't
defend itself. It showed the white
flag everywhere, right away. Then
came the betrayal. That was very
hard for us, since we were in the
midst of transporting our divisions.
Based on news reports, I was already
convinced of the disintegration of
Italy one and half years ago. The
army was infected with Communism and
was sympathetic to the Anglo-Saxons.
We couldn't carry out the counter
stroke before enough German
divisions were over the Alps.
The liberation of the Duce
Next came the real implementation of
the armistice. And then came the --
how should I say -- bold stroke of
our SS men and the men the
Luftwaffe, the liberation of the
Duce. I was very happy that the work
of the Security Service could be
mentioned for once, after all these
years, since it is precisely the
task of the Security Police and
Security Service to work in silence.
Their work is never mentioned,
cannot be mentioned. Their men die
as bravely as our men do at the
front, but their work must not be
mentioned. That which they provide
in terms of important information
and documents, the importance of
that which they do, can never be
mentioned. Thus, it pleased me
greatly that the Security Service --
the work of our friend Heydrich,
which is being carrying on in a
dignified and forceful manner by his
successor Kaltenbrunner -- was able
to show for once, in public, that it
is strong and gets results.
The liberation of the Duce, insofar
as I could tell everywhere, met with
an unprecedented response in our
people, and gave them an
unprecedented boost. But it was also
interesting because it was taught us
that virtues like loyalty and
comradeship are values of the mind
which are profoundly rooted, not
only in the German people, but in
the entire European group of
peoples. Let us never underestimate
the value, the unique eternal value,
of this ideal. The manner in which
our people reacted to this act of
comradeship and loyalty was
therefore a shining example and a
gleaming proof of this fact.
The Balkans
I will briefly list the individual
nations of the Balkans. Croatia, for
the moment in serious disorder, is a
state made up of "page 30 missing,
but text continues apparently
without interruption on page 31" 6
1/2 million men, of whom 3 1/2
million are Croats. 2 million are
Bratislavs, that is, a kind of Serb,
and 1 million are Bosnians.
It is a state with very large
minorities. Its national leader,
Poglawnik, entered office as a
result of the difficult conditions
imposed upon him by the Italians,
and placed at a disadvantage by the
fact that he was forced to renounce
the largest and most valuable parts
of his country. It was obvious that
he not enjoy any authority in this
manner. Most of the country was
occupied by the Italian army. The
bands under Mr. Tito -- he has
become a sort of popular hero there
-- and Mr. Draha Mihailovitsch --
Tito is the Communist man, Draha
Mihailowitsch is the Yugoslavian-
English-American man -- dominated
the situation.
The situation in Slovenia is
similar. Albania's independence was
now recognized by us. Serbia is
naturally the hotbed of conspiracy
in the Balkans, yet it is relatively
quiet. Greece is also somewhat
quieter for the moment.
It is clear that we must concentrate
large numbers of troops to the
Balkans in order to shield and
protect this part of Europe exposed
by the collapse of our ally. We must
expect attacks there by the
Anglo-Americans.
It is naturally of interest that the
Balkans are one of the principal
objects of strife between Russia and
the Anglo-Americans. Russia says:
that's my sphere. And the
Anglo-Americans say: that's our
sphere. The best fruits for us will
grow out of the perpetual strife
between our noble allies.
The other occupied territories
France, the Netherlands, Norway,
Denmark, Belgium, Poland, Bohemia,
and Moravia -- the situation is
known. We must be on the lookout
everywhere, that is clear. We must
expect acts of sabotage, paratroop
attacks, minor rebellions, strikes,
insubordination, and irresolution
everywhere, even among the
favourably-minded elements of the
population. In the Germanic
countries, one thing is quite clear
to me: the majority of the people in
these Germanic countries, in the
bottom of their hearts, will only be
won over when the die has been cast
in the present struggle between the
two Germanic Empires, that is, the
German and British empires, when it
is seen who is the stronger. They
will then fall to the stronger. It
is disagreeable to us that they do
not come to us with open hearts.
But it cannot be denied that the
political preconditions for this did
not exist.
There were no great figures -- this
is the tragedy of the renewal
movements in Holland, in Flanders,
in Norway, and in Denmark -- able to
win their people over to us and lead
them into the Germanic political
community today, according to their
own political laws. It is perhaps --
even probably -- best, from a
historical point of view, that this
is so difficult. The select few who
come to us, and fight in our
Germanic volunteer units, in our
Germanic corps (such as the 3rd SS
Tank Corps) are naturally some of
the most valuable members of the
Germanic nations. These men, who
fought their through to us from out
of 30 million Germanic people, who
were trained among us, will be the
old fighters of the greater Germanic
community.
The sabotage war
We must, of course, anticipate an
increase in the most unpleasant
forms of sabotage, the use of
poisons, explosives, briefly, with
everything. These are things that we
have to pay attention to, which must
be taken seriously down to the
minutest detail, but whose objective
-- wearing down our nerves and
spoiling our good humour -- must
never be permitted to succeed. I say
this in full awareness that every
detail must be taken seriously in
this war. But we must consider
nothing a tragedy, since all these
things do not kill us. They cannot
kill us; they are pinpricks, they
are unpleasant, they hem us in here
and there; but they cannot wound us
mortally. Mortally -- I would like
to emphasize this here for the first
time -- there is only one thing that
can hurt us: a weakening of our will
to resist. He who, in spirit and
determination, refuses to give in,
cannot be defeated, unless he can be
starved out, which is not the case
with us, if he stays strong, as a
man and as a soldier, if he has his
weapons, and cannot be overcome with
these.
The air war
Since the Luftwaffe, which possessed
an absolute mastery of the air in
the first years of the war, has had
to stretch itself out to great
theatres of war all over Europe, and
it has naturally had to be spread
thinner. Since we had to intervene
in Italy in battles involving the
heaviest sacrifices to protect the
security of our supply lines, since
neither the Italian fleet nor the
Italian air force could protect our
supply lines to Africa to any
significant degree, we have suffered
much attrition in Italy.
The terror attacks on our country
have doubtlessly hurt us badly in
many places. I am firmly convinced,
I would like to say that I can state
definitely, that the worst is over,
that we have found a tactic to break
these air attacks, that, through
work, we can multiply our aircraft
production and improve our weapons.
I am firmly convinced that we will
have overcome the chief dangers of
the situation by the end of this
year or the beginning of the next
year, that we will be active again
during the coming year.
The naval war
We really had some bad days for a
time this year. Fate tested us once
again. Just when problems were
appearing on the eastern front, just
when treason was raising its ugly
head in Italy, when the air attacks
were getting terrible, the U boat
war was interrupted, too.
As always in war, things go back and
forth. Sometimes offensive weapons
are stronger, sometimes defensive
weapons. We just went through a
period during which the defensive
weapons of the English were
stronger, were technically superior
to ours. For months, therefore, the
U boat war had to be restricted to a
minimum. As you have seen from the
reports of the last 14 days, we are
now active again. Offensive weapons
have once again recovered and
surpassed the enemy's technical
lead, and offensive weapons are now
once again at an advantage. That is
an example and a lesson that one
must never give up, that a cause is
only lost -- technically,
militarily, spiritually -- when one
gives up. If the Reichsmarschall in
the air force or marines, if
Grossadmiral Doenitz in the navy,
had said, after the low point,
"There's no point, the others are
too powerful, they're better
equipped technically, the U boat is
out of date, or our air force, or
some technical development or other,
is out of date", then the enemy
would have triumphed. When one does
not give in, but rather, as happened
here in both cases, gives the order:
"Ready for action!" -- then, this
example, in both the Air Force and
the navy, shows that things can also
go right on ahead again. You just
have to have the nerves for it.
The domestic front
I now come to another aspect of this
war, the domestic front. Some of the
German people, namely the older men
drafted, are now doing their second
four-year world war. The German
people were already very tense
["gespannt" -- nervous or excited],
years before the war, because of the
armaments, the Four Year Plan [?],
the recovery of Austria [?], the
Sudetenland [?], and the occupation
of Bohemia and Moravia.
[Translator's note: why would they
be nervous or tense about Austria or
Sudetenland, for example? Bohemia
and Moravia, yes.]
There can be no doubt that hostile
propaganda is now streaming and
trickling into the German people
from many sides. We are
unfortunately unable to screen off
hostile broadcasters entirely, or in
any manner worth mentioning. The
temptation has grown to listen to
hostile broadcasters, who achieve
better psychological effects than we
do, sometimes, unfortunately, very
good ones.
As in all cases in which a
prohibition or law cannot be given
the emphasis of enforcement by
executive authority and punishment,
the effect of the prohibition is
harmful to authority; that is true
in this case as well. We have, of
course, prohibited listening to
hostile broadcasters, but we were
not, and are not, able to punish
violations of this prohibition in
any meaningful way. Today we pay
somewhat more attention to it to
some extent, since, when Mr.
Badoglio committed his piece of
piggery, when treason ran amuck in
Europe, the result was naturally a
wave of defeatism in Germany.
Shortly before, after the air
attacks on Hamburg, a mood of crisis
prevailed in many cities, which
were, particularly our beloved
capital of Berlin, almost panicky
for days, until the mood calmed down
and levelled off again.
As a result of listening to foreign
broadcasters, talk then circulated
through the channels which always
exist, even in a great people, "Oh
God, we can no longer win the war.
Wouldn't it be better therefore",
etc. etc. Then came this highly
interesting remark: "Ah, a Duce can
be arrested, how interesting". When
the Duce was arrested I said to
myself, now we've really got to
watch it. The people who think
that's so interesting, they interest
me.
Since that time, as you may note
from the reports from the
Reichsministry of Justice, and you
will continue to note over the
coming few weeks, Mr. Administrative
Advisor so and so, and Mr. Factory
Owner so and so, and Mr. Waiter, and
Mr. Chauffeur, and Mr. Plumber, and
Mr. Employee, have all had their
pretty little heads cut off and
placed between their feet for
damaging the morale of the German
people as defeatists, for
disintegrating the powers of
resistance of the German people, and
for treason. It's really not
important for us to kill anyone. If
we really had to shoot as many
people as all that, or as many as
I'd have to, it would get
increasingly difficult to sign a
death sentence.
When I was appointed Reichsminister
of the Interior, everybody said
(since it's so awfully easy to say),
"Mister, hit hard, stay tough. The
German people expect terrible
severity from you". I'm already
severe, I don't need any
admonitions. It's very easy to say
something like that, but: a death
sentence means eternal misery for a
whole family; it means bringing
shame on a name which was once
honourable. Imagine for a moment
what it will mean to the children
and grandchildren of that family,
when it is later said (you must
always visualize these things as
they will look 10 or 15 years after
the war): "The father of this family
was beheaded for high treason during
the Great War, which involved the
fate of the Germanic nation". (In
the distant future, everything we do
today will look heroic. Human
weaknesses will then be forgotten.
All the cowards will have died off
in the meantime, and in the end
everybody will be considered a
hero). Such a family will be shamed
for all time. I know all that. I
know how hard it is; and I therefore
try to restrict the necessary
educational measures.
I know that there's a great deal of
theft in Germany, that the concept
of private property has been much
weakened by suffering, and by the
relaxation of all moral standards
such as always happens in war, or
due to a poor upbringing of the
German people in this regard. I
can't catch every thief, I'll never
catch them all. I don't even want to
catch them all, otherwise I'd have
to arrest too many thousands of
people. I'll never catch every
defeatist.
I'm perfectly well aware that, in
one or two years, when the divisions
and regiments withdraw into their
garrisons -- some of the older
veterans having been wounded up to 7
or 8 or 9 or 10 times, while the
rest no longer march with us because
they lie under the grass; when, I
hope, a still decent part of the old
SS once again marches back to
Germany, I know that many thousands
will applaud us then, and perhaps
feel themselves to have been much
more heroic than we were, or -- we
don't think of ourselves as heroic
-- more decent than we were.
It will always be like that. I don't
mind. We shouldn't mind either. We
should never lose our sense of
humour. It is, however, necessary to
set an example for the number of
cowards who can be found among every
people. It is, God knows,
unfortunately true that these
cowards are always found in the
upper, rather than the lower or
middle, ranks of a people. Intellect
obviously ruins the character in
some manner, at least as regards the
formation of will and energy. It's
enough for me, for such education,
if I always grab one out of 100 of
the defeatists who later cry
"hurrah", and lay his head between
his feet. Then the others will shut
up for a quarter of a year. Then all
the little mommies will say, "For
God's sake, don't get yourself
killed, don't make us unhappy.
Somebody we know was recently
beheaded. It's in the newspapers. So
just keep quiet, cry 'hurrah' very
loud".
Good, let him; we've achieved our
objective. We could never storm a
fort or a front line position with a
person like that anyway. We know
that anyway. But the main thing is
to keep them from hurting our decent
people. Insofar as is necessary,
action will be taken brutally and
mercilessly. None of us enjoys that.
Although we don't like it, you must
act mercilessly, gentlemen, without
regard to family relationships, or
acquaintance, or class, or possible
previous earlier service; without
regard to whether he is a party
comrade or not, when the fate of the
nation so requires. Always go after
a big fish rather than a little one
who's stupid and has been fooled.
The domestic front will always be in
order if we have the nerve to keep
it in order, although it gives us no
pleasure to take action personally.
Foreigners in the Reich
We must be also clear in our minds
that we have 6 or 7 million
foreigners in Germany. There may
even be 8 million.
We have prisoners in Germany. They
are not all dangerous, as long as we
strike hard at the smallest minor
problem.
It's a small matter to shoot 10
Poles today, instead of maybe having
to shoot tens of thousands in their
place later, and compared to the
fact that shooting those tens of
thousands would also cost German
blood, too. Every little blaze must
be immediately stamped out,
smothered, extinguished; otherwise,
just as in a real fire, a veritable
prairie fire, politically and
psychologically, may break out among
the people.
Communists in the Reich
I don't believe that the Communists
will try anything, because their
leaders, just like most other
criminals in our country, are in
concentration camps. Something must
be said here: only after the war
will it be seen what a blessing it
was for Germany -- all humanitarian
drivel to the contrary
notwithstanding -- that we locked
this whole criminal underclass up in
the concentration camps -- I'll take
care of that myself. If they were
running around loose, it would be
much harder for us. Particularly
since the subhumans would then have
their subordinate officers and
commanders; they'd have their
workers' councils and soldiers'
councils. But this way, they're all
locked up, and are making grenades,
artillery shells, or other important
things, and are very useful members
of human society.
The situation on the enemy side
Now I would like to give a short
overview of the other side. We
Germans always see-saw between
extremes. Either we are totally
exhilarated and applauding
enthusiastically, and we can't wait
until we have reached all our
objectives in a lightning war of 18,
16, or even 15 days; or we let our
jaws hang down and whine: "Yes, the
enemy is wonderful in everything.
The English are doing great. The
Russians are doing great; we're the
only ones that aren't".At the same
time, we completely forget that, on
the other side, like everywhere
else, they can't do the impossible
either.
Russia
I would like to list our various
enemies quite briefly. Once again,
Russia. Here, I can sum up quite
briefly. Russia will, in my opinion,
when the next great offensives are
over, have just about exhausted its
human potential.
One can, of course, draft sixteen
year olds, they can make an early
grab at fifteen year olds -- I am
absolutely in favour of us doing the
same, if the fate of the nation so
requires, since it is better for
fifteen years to die than for the
nation to die -- but one cannot
continue endlessly in this
direction, since, in the end, with
thirteen year olds and twelve year
olds one can no longer wage war.
Human potential is, in my view, one
of the weakest points of the
Russians, although it was once their
greatest strength. In addition, in
my conviction, unprecedented famine
now prevails among the Russians,
something which can never be
correctly evaluated by us. The front
line is, however, still better fed
than the people behind the front.
Nevertheless, it is still very bad
in many cases even at the front. The
Russian has had great transport
difficulties for a long time. These,
too, are not yet overcome. I don't
believe that the Russians are weak
in a material sense; rather, I
believe that they will die of hunger
and loss of blood.
England
England has been waging war for four
years now. So far, it has suffered
no very great losses in blood. In
England, however, the constant fear
-- the very correct fear -- prevails
that, when the U boat war sets in
again with full force -- and it will
do that for months now, in my view
-- the whole equilibrium in food,
supplies, and landing possibilities
will fall to pieces. Since all the
military operations that England and
America wish to carry out, will
stand or fall on tonnage. The
landing operations that they carried
out at Salerno doubtlessly cost them
half a million tons. I very much
doubt whether England can permit
itself many such landing operations
over the long term. I nevertheless
believe that England will undertake
landing operations, perhaps even
this fall -- they don't have much
time left for this -- but certainly
early in the year. But there is
another thing I believe: when the
war for England -- and this applies
even more so for America later --
really becomes a matter of the blood
of their sons, the war in England
and America will be more unpopular
that it is already.
America
America is waging a war on two
fronts, even more than England: the
Pacific war against Japan, which,
fortunately, is a stronger, more
warlike ally "than Italy etc."; and
the war in Europe, or the Atlantic.
I do not believe that the conditions
in America are for the best. One
must keep in mind that America still
has a great number of Jews, and a
brutally plutocratic form of
economics. It is hardly conceivable
how they push and shove in America.
I believe we were still babes in the
woods by comparison in 1918. The
difficulties and misery gradually
appearing before the population in
America are furthermore
inconceivable. In addition, we have
taken Mr. Roosevelt's best electoral
propaganda point -- he will
certainly be reelected next year --
away from him through the liberation
of the Duce.
A "show trial" of Mussolini and
fascism was in fact intended to be
the central point of his electoral
propaganda.
The following applies, however, to
both countries: the war will become
fearfully unpopular in England and
America the moment England and
America have to fight somewhere in
Europe, whether in Italy, the
Balkans, or even France, Denmark, or
Norway. This applies especially to
America. England fought the last
world war using its own people.
America, on the other hand, had, I
believe, 60 to 70,000 dead in the
World War. That was, unfortunately,
far too few. I am convinced that if
the Americans had suffered 500,000
dead in the World War, they wouldn't
have entered the war this time. It
will be a difficult psychological
point for those gentlemen when the
number of dead exceeds that of the
World War. Once the number reaches
the hundred thousand mark or climbs
into the hundreds of thousands, then
enormous difficulties will set in
for the Americans. The Americans are
in fact by no means as brave as they
act. On the contrary: the American
is by no means a brave soldier; he
is well armed, he has very strong
artillery, he is well equipped in
all things, but he is not a good
infantryman.
Political problems on the enemy side
Now come the great political
difficulties. England and America
are not united. England says:
"America, you must help me more in
Europe". Naturally, in doing so,
each swindler wants to cheat the
other. Each is seeking to exploit
the strength of the other. America
wants England to help defeat Japan.
England is trying to exploit the
Americans in order to defeat
Germany. England is in a situation
which is becoming increasingly
difficult. Mr. Churchill can't hide
this from his countrymen. What is
England really fighting for?
And then come the difficulties with
Russia. Stalin, a brutal, ice-cold,
power politician, says: "I am
bearing the chief brunt of the war.
Therefore, I want to have the say in
Europe. Poland, the Balkans, Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, are in my
spheres of interest. Germany, when
it is defeated, will also be in my
sphere of interest". Now they are
starting to have a hard time on the
other side. The war with Germany
really started because they gave
guarantees to Poland. That's why Mr.
Sikorski had to die too, I believe
-- because he clung to this old
fairy tale. This naturally caused
frightful difficulties for England.
So England has now issued an
Atlantic Charter as well. But
England is in even greater need of
Russia as an ally. It is, in fact,
its strongest ally on the continent.
So while Bolshevik Russia wants to
have the say in Europe, England
would dearly like -- as it is so
beautifully called - to maintain the
"balance of power" in Europe, and
not let the Bolsheviks into Europe,
for God's sake.
It is a chaotic jumble of interests
and views, of intentions and plans.
Each one wants to exploit and
swindle the other for his own plan,
and then bring home the harvest for
himself. That is a system which
will, of course, hold together for a
while, but which will certainly
collapse one day. The moment the
alliance collapses, the power of our
enemies will, of course, still be
considerable, but not threatening.
The war will be won by the side that
continues to hit back, and keeps
hitting back, who never surrenders.
For us, the end of the war -- once
Russia is exhausted and drops out
one day, and the war becomes a
burden for England and America, will
bring us confirmation as a world
power "Weltreich". Because we can
really say by comparison -- though
there are problems with every
comparison -- that the Seven Years
War brought Prussia's confirmation
as a great European power. That war
was carried on for seven years to
ensure that the already conquered
province of Silesia would remain
part of Prussia. This war will
ensure that everything annexed to
the German Reich, to Greater
Germany, and then to the Germanic
Reich in the years since 1938, will
remain ours. This war is being
carried on to keep the path to the
East open; so that Germany may be a
world power; to found the Germanic
World Empire "Germanische
Weltreich". That will be the meaning
of this war, whether it lasts 5, 6,
perhaps even 7 years. We don't know
how long it will last. We don't even
even ask how long. It will be
carried on by us for as long as it
lasts, and it will be carried on
with determination and good humour
by us for as long as it lasts. It
will be won by the side that stands,
that doesn't give up or give in
[verb: "umfallen"], even in the most
difficult situations. To ensure that
this never happens, is our principal
task.
The SS in the war
Now I come to our own development,
to the development of the SS over
the past few months. The development
was, when I look back over the
entire war, unprecedented. It has
gone ahead at a truly astonishing
pace. Let's take a look back at the
year 1939. Then we were a couple of
regiments, 8 to 9,000 men in police
units. We were armed, of course, but
only received our artillery regiment
as the heavy branch of service to
all practice purposes two months
before the start of the war. Let us
recapitulate the tasks, duties, and
missions entrusted to us over the
past 4 1/2 years. First, however, I
would like to list and once again
describe some still further external
changes.
Personnel changes
The following changes have been made
in the Main Offices: The successor
to our fallen comrade and friend
Heydrich is our comrade SS
Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner. He
is unfortunately sick today. He has
phlebitis, but it is not, however,
dangerous, thank God. That is why he
could not come.
Our old friend Daluege has such a
serious heart problem that he is
taking a cure, and must now withdraw
from active service for 1 1/2 to 2
years. I would like to send a
teletype or telegram this evening to
our two friends, namely Daluege and
Kaltenbrunner, on behalf of all of
us. We hope that Daluege will be
well again and able to go into
action on the front line again in,
as I say, approximately 2 years.
On his behalf, SS Obergruppenführer
Wuennenberg, who previously led the
Police Division, and was then
designated to lead the 4th SS Tank
Corps as Commanding General, who is
a General in the Waffen SS and the
Police, while heading the Order
Police as Chief of the Order Police.
Gruppenführer Breithaupt, as the
Chief of the SS Court, has succeeded
our old comrade and friend, Scharfe
of the SS.
SS Obergruppenführer Hofmann has
changed posts. He has given up the
Race and Settlement Main Office, and
has become the Higher SS and Police
Leader Southwest.
SS Gruppenführer Hildebrandt has
given up his Upper Section Weichsel
and has become Chief of the Race and
Settlement Main Office.
SS Obergruppenführer Schmidt has
given up the Personnel Main Office
at his own request, and has entered
my personal staff for Special Tasks.
His successor is SS Gruppenführer
von Herff.
One of my closest and oldest
associates, SS Obergruppenführer
Wolff, after a severe illness which
seriously endangered his life
(operation for kidney stone) has,
thank God, gotten well again, and is
now -- it is the first time anyone
has held this position -- the
Highest SS and Police Leader for all
of occupied Italy. He is therefore
responsible for a region with 25 to
30 million inhabitants. SS
Gruppenführer Globocnik as the
Highest SS and Police Leader for the
littoral, as well as several other
SS and Police Leaders, will be
subordinate to him. He could not
come today.
Higher SS and Police Leaders have
since then been assigned as follows:
in Croatia, Kammerhofer, who, at the
request of the Croats, is not called
Higher SS and Police Leader there,
but rather the Representative of the
Reichsfueher SS; this was formerly
Meyszner's title in Serbia; it is
now Stroob's title in Greece -- I
would like to say right away that I
am reassigning him to Schimana. You
will become the Higher SS and Police
Leader in Greece; you will not,
therefore, lead the SS Volunteer
Division for Galicia. SS
Gruppenführer Hanke will become
Higher SS and Police Leader in
Denmark.
The corps and brigades
In the Waffen SS, since we saw each
other last, we have progressed to
the next stage of organizational
development.
At that time, 1 1/2 years ago, we
were just forming the 1st SS Tank
Corps led by SS Obergruppenführer
Hausser, who is now leading
operations on the Italian littoral.
In the meantime, the following corps
have been created or are being
formed:
- the 1st SS Tank Corps under SS
Gruppenführer Sepp Dietrich,
consisting of the SS Tank Division
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and
the SS Tank Division "Hitler Youth",
which is now being formed;
- the 2nd SS Tank Corps under SS
Obergruppenführer Hausser,
consisting of the SS Tank Division
"Das Reich" and the SS Tank Division
"Death's Head";
- the 3rd SS Tank Corps, the
Germanic one, under SS Gruppenführer
Steiner, consisting of the Tank
Division "Viking", now in the East,
and of a new unit now being formed,
the SS Volunteer Tank Grenadier
Division "Nordland", and the SS
Volunteer Tank Grenadier Brigade
"Nederland".
The 4th SS Tank Corps under SS
Gruppenführer Krueger, who
previously led the Division "Das
Reich", consisting of two new
divisions, namely, the existing SS
Tank Division "Hohenstaufen", which
were recruited by SS
Obergruppenführer Berger from the
9th Division, together with the 10th
Division, in February of this year,
over a period of 5 to 6 weeks, and
trained and formed by SS
Obergruppenführer Juettner.
That was a masterpiece, I can tell
you, the greatest piece of daring.
It was the most fearful situation
that I had seen for several weeks.
The old Tank Corps, consisting of
the "Reich", "Leibstandarte", and
the "Death's Head", were taken away
from France.
In the second half of December came
the order from the führer: on 15.2
two new SS divisions are to be
recruited in France out of the Work
Service Camps from youths born in
1925. You could write a book about
it later, and tell the whole story
about how difficult that was, but it
was done nevertheless.
Those recruits were trained with
live ammunition from the very first
day, since we never knew whether the
English were coming. After 8 weeks,
they were already considerably
better, and now they have become
magnificently good divisions. At the
moment, we have been ordered to form
the 16th and 17th Divisions by
January. We are already mutually
occupied with this hard work. The
4th Tank Corps will be formed from
the SS Tank Division "Hohenstaufen"
(9th Div.), and a new division is to
be formed, to be called the SS Tank
Grenadier Division "Reichsführer
SS". It will be formed from the
Brigade "Reichsführer SS" which, we
hope, has succeeded in getting out
of Corsica today with the last man;
- the 5th SS Mountain Corps under SS
Gruppenführer Phleps, consisting of
the SS Volunteer Mountain Division
"Prince Eugene" and a Bosnian
Mountain Division (SS Volunteers
b.h. Mountain Division) (Croatia),
now being formed;
- the 6th SS Volunteer Corps, the
Latvian one, under SS Gruppenführer
Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, consisting of a
Latvian brigade formed in the
meantime, and which fought very well
on the Volchov (the Latvian SS
Volunteer Grenadier Brigade), and a
Latvian unit now being formed and
soon to be in full strength (the
Latvian SS Volunteer Infantry
Division), among others;
- the 7th SS Tank Corps, which is
now being formed, with an already
existing SS Tank Division (10th
Division) in France, which has been
given the name "Frundsberg", and the
(17th) SS Tank Grenadier Division,
which was initially given a next
very strange sounding, but -- when
correctly understood -- very defiant
name: "Goetz von Berlichingen".
"Frundsberg" and "Goetz von
Berlichingen": these names are a
declaration of defiance made by us
against our enemies, both domestic
and foreign.
In addition, we have formed still
more brigades and assault brigades.
In the future, when everything
squeezed out of the Waffen SS, and
the manner in which the Waffen SS
gave of itself, can finally be
described in detail, it will seem a
considerable performance.
Chief of the anti-partisan units
In the meantime, I also created the
Office of the Chief of the
Anti-Partisan Combat Units. The
Chief of the Anti- Partisan Combat
Units is our comrade SS
Obergruppenführer von dem Bach. I
considered it necessary that the
Reichsführer SS should be the
commanding officer, in keeping with
his authority, for all these
combats, since I am convinced that
we are in the best position to
concern ourselves with the
outspokenly political struggle
carried on by our enemy. We've been
successful insofar as the units
available to us, and formed by us,
weren't repeatedly taken away to
plug up gaps in the front.
It should be noted that the creation
of these offices, in the order of
division, corps, army, has led to
the next stage, namely, that of
Supreme Command of an army or even
of a group, if you want to call it
that, for the SS.
Order Police and Security Police
Now briefly on the tasks of the
Order Police and Security Police.
They have remained within the same
framework.
What was achieved, I can only say,
is enormous. We have formed
approximately 30 police regiments
out of police reservists and former
"police soldiers", or police
officials, as they were formerly
called. The average age in our
police battalions is no less than in
the Security Battalions of the
Wehrmacht. The performance is
magnificent, surpassing all praise.
We have also formed police regiments
by combining previously formed
police battalions of "native
peoples". That is, we no longer left
these police battalions by
themselves, but we mixed them in a
ratio of 1:3. That is why we have
achieved much greater stability with
them than with any of the other
domestic or native units, precisely
in the present time of crisis.
The tasks of the Security Police,
just like those of the Order Police,
have grown together with the
expanding geographical territory. It
is precisely in this connection that
we will only be able to talk about
our accomplishments after the war.
It will certainly be entertaining to
be able to speak to our counterparts
in the Secret Service and lay our
cards on the table on both sides.
Life is not being made easy for us
by the other side. At the same time,
you should never forget that the
fortunate situation in which we now
find ourselves, in having occupied
many parts of Europe, also involves
the disadvantage of having millions
of people, and dozens of foreign
nationalities, under us, and
therefore against us. Everyone who
is a convinced Communist is
automatically against us; every
Freemason, every democrat, every
convinced Christian, is against us.
These are the ideological enemies
opposing us all over Europe, all of
whom the enemy has for himself.
Nationalism, correctly or
incorrectly understood -- in France,
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, or
Serbia -- is against us. The enemy
can therefore exploit this ground,
which has been magnificently well
prepared for him, for his acts of
sabotage and parachute activities at
any time.
We didn't have these problems until
now, except in the Caucausus and in
Iran, which is very far away.
Our dear English and American
adversaries are already on the
continent. They have southern Italy,
we have northern Italy. Now we'll
see some fireworks. I'm glad of it.
It will be a wonderful opportunity
for us to show what we are capable
of in this area. It will be our
first chance to meet the English in
this field with the same weapons for
once. The only foreign people the
English have under them are the
Irish. The Irish, however, are so
Catholic, and so preoccupied with
religion, that despite their
national hostility to England they
are kept calm, neutralized by the
Church, so that we cannot use them.
An opportunity is now appearing for
the first time.
You can be sure we will not fail it
to make use of it.
Tasks as Reichsministers of the
Interior
In addition to all everything else
we've achieved in this time, I can
not keep silent about the fact that
I have become Reichsminister of the
Interior. I have a little bit more
work. I view my responsibilities as
falling into the following general
groups:
1. restoration of the authority of
the Reich, which has, to a great
extent, been lost;
2. decentralization of tasks not of
importance to the Reich. To keep the
Reich in hand, while calling upon
all the creative powers slumbering
in the German people under German
self-government;
3. radical elimination of corruption
or misconduct throughout this entire
apparatus and in every case. I will
proceed ruthlessly. If somebody has
done something wrong and if I catch
him, he's coming before the Khadi
"judge", big or little, since such a
case, exorcised and carried out in
public, does not harm respect for
the state and party, but strengthens
it, because then everybody says:
"All kinds of respect. Decent. If
somebody's a rascal, throw him out".
That applies just as much to us
within the SS. I am now coming to a
few things which, as is my custom, I
will state clearly. It is quite
clear that human shortcomings are
found everywhere. Organizations
distinguish themselves only through
the following: one organization
conceals them and thinks it has to
cover them up with the famous
blanket of Christian brotherly love,
so as not to hurt its prestige.
Another organization cleanses itself
brutally. It says, "He was a swine,
we've shot him", or "We've locked
him up", or, in any case, "We threw
him out".
Then it says, "page misnumbered;
sentence follows without
interruption" "Now, get busy and
blabber about it or do something
else." That gives it the right to
say: "If anybody else among you is a
swine, then he's going to get the
same". As Reichsführer SS, as Chief
of the German Police, and now as
Reichsminister of the Interior, I
would have no moral right to proceed
against any racial comrade, nor
could we bring forth the strength to
do so, if we did not take care to
cleanse our own own ranks brutally.
You can be sure that I will do this
as Reichsminister of the Interior.
You can also be sure that I will not
go off at a madman's clip, and then
maybe pull the bridle so hard that
the nag falls down on his
hindquarters; rather, the bit will
be pulled slowly and gradually, so
the horse will be brought to a
decent pace again.
SS - economic operations
I'm now coming to a few other great
individual areas of responsibility,
which you must all know something
about.
We have gigantic armaments
industries in the concentration
camps. That is the responsibility of
our friend SS Group Leader Pohl. We
put in many millions of manhours on
armaments each month. We tackle the
most ungrateful problems, and I must
admit that whether it's in Pohl's
concentration camps or his economic
operations, whether outside among
the Higher SS and Police Leaders or
in the factories of the SS
Administrative Main Office, one
thing is obvious: we are SS men
wherever we are. If something is in
a bad way, get right down to it.
Educate every subordinate in this
direction for me. We want to help
without being hindered by
jurisdiction, since, after all, we
want to win the war. Whatever we do,
after all, we're doing for Germany.
Whether it involves the building of
a street or tunnel isn't going ahead
somewhere; whether it's an invention
which can't come into existence due
to sheer bureaucracy, or whether
it's something else: wherever we can
lend a hand, we're going to do it.
Whatever we achieve in our armaments
factories will be a considerable
accomplishment, one which is worth
seeing, even if we can only describe
and estimate it at the end of the
war.
The evacuation of the Jews
I want to mention another very
difficult matter here before you in
all frankness. Among ourselves, it
ought to be spoken of quite openly
for once; yet we shall never speak
of it in public. Just as little as
we hesitated to do our duty as
ordered on 30 June 1934, and place
comrades who had failed against the
wall and shoot them, just as little
did we ever speak of it, and we
shall never speak of it. It was a
matter of course, of tact, for us,
thank God, never to speak of it,
never to talk of it. It made
everybody shudder; yet everyone was
clear in his mind that he would do
it again if ordered to do so, and if
it was necessary.
I am thinking now of the evacuation
of the Jews.. It is one of those
things that's easy to say: "The
Jewish people will be extirpated" ,
says every Party comrade, "that's
quite clear, it's in our programme:
elimination ["Ausschaltung"] of the
Jews, extirpation ["Ausrottung"];
that's what we're doing." And then
they all come along, these 80
million good Germans, and every one
of them has his decent Jew. Of
course, it's quite clear that the
others are pigs, but this one is one
first-class Jew. Of all those who
speak this way, not one has looked
on; not one has lived through it.
Most of you know what it means when
100 bodies lie together, when 500
lie there, or if 1,000 lie there. To
have gone through this, and at the
same time, apart from exceptions
caused by human weaknesses, to have
remained decent, that has made us
hard. This is a chapter of glory in
our history which has never been
written, and which never shall be
written; since we know how hard it
would be for us if we still had the
Jews, as secret saboteurs,
agitators, and slander-mongers,
among us now, in every city --
during the bombing raids, with the
suffering and deprivations of the
war. We would probably already be in
the same situation as in 1916/17 if
we still had the Jews in the body of
the German people.
The riches they had, we've taken
away from them. I have given a
strict order, which SS Group Leader
Pohl has carried out, that these
riches shall, of course, be diverted
to the Reich without exception. We
have taken none of it. Individuals
who failed were punished according
to an order given by me at the
beginning, which threatened: he who
takes even one mark of it, that's
his death. A number of SS men -- not
very many -- have violated that
order, and that will be their death,
without mercy. We had the moral
right, we had the duty to our own
people, to kill this people which
wanted to kill us ["dieses Volk,
dass uns umbringen wollte,
umzubringen"].
[Translator's note: it is unclear
whether the writer is referring to
the Jews as a race, or to the Jews
as saboteurs, agitators, and
slander-mongerers; see above].
But we don't have the right to
enrich ourselves even with one fur,
one watch, one mark, one cigarette,
or anything else. Just because we
eradicated ["ausgerottet"] a
bacillus, after all, doesn't mean we
want to be infected by the bacillus
and die. I will never permit even
one little spot of corruption to
arise or become established here.
Wherever it may form, we shall burn
it out together. In general,
however, we can say that we have
carried out this most difficult task
out of love for our own people. And
we have suffered no harm to our
inner self, our soul, our character
in so doing.
The attitude of the SS man
In describing what we have done in
this one year, in a -- I would
almost like to say -- statement of
accounts, for all of us, and before
us all, there is one thing I must
neither overlook nor neglect: the
significance of the SS Man's
attitude. Here, I believe, we have
endured decently, generally and on
the whole, as in all other things as
well. The attitude of our brave
leaders and men was proper in
desperate situations at the front,
where they, in the darkest hours, in
the very darkest hours, grew out
beyond themselves, in life and in
death, in this heroic great death,
which has continued over the last 10
weeks. The attitude of our men was,
generally and as a whole, good
throughout the partisan war, even in
the remotest areas. Their attitude
was also good in the homeland.
Because my attitude is more
important than what I say. The
people, the little man, in the
misery of his heart and with fear in
the pit of his stomach, is already
looking at our attitude in many
cases today, asking: "How does the
SS Man stand? What's his facial
expression? Does he look miserable?
Does he let his jaw sag?" Or: "How
does this SS battalion march to the
front?" Or: "How did the police
guard act during the scuffles in the
Balkans or in Russia? Or: "How does
the SS man act during an air raid?
Does he stick around, or does he
take to his heels? Is he the one who
prevents a panic and helps dig
people out?" Or contrariwise: "Is
there an SS Leader or SS Man who
claims special rights, who travels
by car where he isn't entitled, who
lives better than other people, who
does no extra duty and takes every
Sunday off, whose wife makes endless
demands, who gets herself in a twist
and won't do this and won't do that,
and makes unreasonable demands while
others are being bombed?" Or are our
wives the hardest- working, the most
modest, the bravest, those who never
criticize, who hold their heads high
at all times?
In general and as a whole, our
attitude was good. There is still
room for improvement in our ranks.
To say this is part of the duty of a
Commander or Group Leader. I would
like to head this chapter "We,
Ourselves".
The principle of selection
We have arisen through the law of
selection. We have selected from the
average of our people. Our people
arose through the dice game of Fate
and history in long primaeval times,
over generations and centuries.
Foreign peoples swept over this
people and left their hereditary
material in them. Channels of
foreign blood flowed into this
people; yet this people has
nevertheless, through horrifying
misery and frightful blows of fate,
still had, in their blood vessels,
the strength to endure.
Thus, this entire people has been
drenched in, and is held together
by, Nordic-Faelisch-Germanic blood;
so that in the end one could, and
still can, continue to speak of a
German people. Out of this people,
the result of diverse mixtures of
hereditary factors, such as was
available after the collapse which
followed the years of the struggle
for freedom, we have now consciously
attempted to select the northern
Germanic blood, since we could
assume that this part of the blood
was the bearer of the creative and
heroic, of the life-maintaining
qualities of our people. We examined
the outward appearance on the one
hand, and then revised that outward
appearance in terms of new
requirements on the other hand,
through more and more samples, both
physical and intellectual, both of
character and soul.
We repeatedly sought out and
rejected that which was not
suitable, that which did not adapt
to us. As long as we possess the
strength to do so, this Order will
remain healthy. The moment we forget
the law of the racial foundation of
our people, the law of selection and
severity with regards to ourselves,
then the germ of death will lie
within us; in that moment we will
perish, just as every human
organization, every prime of life in
this world, comes to an end at last.
To enable this flourishing and
bearing of fruit to continue for as
long and as blessedly as possible,
and -- don't be alarmed -- for as
many thousands of years as possible,
must be our aspiration and our inner
law. For that reason, it is our
duty, whenever we meet and whatever
we do, to remember our principle:
blood, selection, severity. The law
of nature is precisely this: what is
hard, is good; what is strong, is
good; that which endures out of the
struggle for existence, both
physically and in terms of will and
soul, is good -- always viewed from
the vantage point of time.
Naturally, somebody can rise to the
top for a while -- this has often
happened in history -- through
swindling and cheating. For nature,
for the fate of the earth, for the
fate of the world, that doesn't
matter. Reality, that is, nature,
fate, purges the swindler after a
time -- not viewed in the ages of
men, but in the ages of the world.
Never to deceive ourselves, but
rather to remain genuine at all
times, that must always be our
endeavour; that is what we must
advocate and inculcate in ourselves,
in every young man, and in every one
of our subordinates, over and over
again.
The SS after the war
One thing must be clear, one thing I
would like to say to you again
today: the true forging together of
our Order, this Order which we built
up over ten long years, the
fundamental principles of which we
founded ten years before the war,
and in which it was educated, will
only begin when the war is over.
That will still remain to be
accomplished by us -- if I may say
so, we, the old fighters -- in
twenty exhausting years of hard work
after the end of the war, to create
a tradition of 30, 35, 45 years,
that is, a generation. This Order
will then march into the future,
young and strong, revolutionary and
effective, to fulfil its task of
providing the Germanic people with a
superior stock ["Oberschicht"]
capable of binding this Germanic
people and this Europe together and
holding them together, producing the
intellects that required by the
people, in economics, farming,
politics, and as soldiers,
statesmen, and technicians. In
addition, this superior stock must
be so strong, so filled with life,
that each generation will be
capable, without question, of
sacrificing two or three sons from
each family on the battlefield, yet
nevertheless ensure the passing on
of the bloodline.
The virtues of the SS man
I now wish to speak of the most
important virtues which I began to
preach and to inculcate in this
Order, in the entire Allgemeine SS
-- since that is the basis of the
Order -- years ago, and which are of
such decisive meaning and importance
now, precisely in the 5th year of
the war.
1. Loyalty
So far, thank God, no case has
occurred in our ranks in which a
reputable SS Man was disloyal. Let
one thing be the guideline here:
should anyone in your circle of
comrades ever be disloyal to the
führer or the Reich, even if only in
thought, you must ensure that he is
expelled from the Order, and we will
ensure that he is expelled from
life. Since everything, I already
said this and I'll repeat it once
again today, everything can be
pardoned in this world, but there is
one thing which cannot be pardoned
among Germanic people, and that is
disloyalty. It would be
unpardonable, and it is
unpardonable. Cases like the
Badoglio affair in Italy should, and
never will, happen in Germany. The
name Badoglio will in the future be
a term of abuse for bad dogs, for
four-legged mongrel curs, just as in
ancient times "Thersites" was a term
of abuse for traitors. We can only
say one thing, and say it again and
again: let the German people, every
one of its men and every one of its
women, prove, through unprecedented,
unconditional loyalty, that this
German people is worthy of living in
the era of an Adolf Hitler, for
which people the führer arose and
dedicated his life, filled with
care, filled with responsibility,
and filled with work for our
Germanic German people.
2) Obedience
Obedience is required and given in
the soldier's life, morning, noon,
and night. The little man always
obeys, or almost always. If he
doesn't, he's locked up. The
question of obedience among the
bearers of higher honours in the
State, party, and army, and even
here and there in the SS, is more
difficult. I would like to state
something here clearly and
unequivocally: that the little man
must obey is a matter of course. It
is even more a matter of course that
all SS high-ranking SS Leaders, that
is, the entire Group Leadership
Corps, should be a model of
unconditional obedience.
If anybody believes that a command
is based on mistaken perceptions on
the part of a superior or on
mistaken information, it is a matter
of course, that he -- that is, every
one of you -- has the duty and the
responsibility to speak out, stating
his reasons manfully and truthfully,
if he is convinced that they
mitigate against the command.
But once the superior or
Reichsführer SS involved -- in most
cases, it the Group Leadership Corps
which is concerned -- or, even, the
führer, has decided and has given an
order, it must be carried out, not
just to the letter and to the text,
but in keeping with the intent.
Whoever carries out the order must
do so as a loyal trustee, as the
true representative of the authority
giving the order.
If you ever believe that an order is
mistaken or even wrong, then there
are two possibilities: if you don't
believe that you can take
responsibility for an order, then
you must state honestly: "I cannot
take responsibility for it, I wish
to be discharged from carrying out
the order". In most cases, you will
be ordered to carry it out anyway.
Either that, or your superior will
think: "His nerves are shot, he's
weak". Then he might say, "OK, you
can retire from service".
But orders are holy. If the generals
obey, then the army will obey, too,
as a matter of course. The holiness
of an order becomes more and more
important with the increasing size
of our territory. To enforce an
order in our little Germany isn't at
all difficult. To carry out an order
when we have garrisons on the Urals
-- as we will have one day, of that
I am convinced -- that will be a
good deal harder. In this case, it
will not always be possible to
verify that the order has been
carried out. Verification, among us,
must not and never will consist of
enforcement by a commissar, as in
Russia. The only commissar we have
must be our own conscience, our
faithfulness to duty, loyalty,
obedience. If you set this example,
gentlemen, then every subordinate
will follow your example. But you
will never be able to demand
obedience if you do not first show
the same obedience to authority
yourselves, unconditionally and
without restriction.
3) Bravery
I don't think there is much need for
admonitions on bravery among us,
since our führer is brave, and our
men are brave. For curiosity's sake,
however, I would like to give you a
contrasting example: an example of
how things are done among the
Russians; I would also like to
express a few thoughts in this
regard. I heard the following story
from an Estonian officer who was
incorporated into the Red Army with
his Estonian company, but who
succeeded in escaping: a unit of the
Red Army carried out an attack which
was repulsed by the Germans.
Afterwards, the unit commissar
ordered the officers to a
conference. The officers had had to
report to the dugout, in a
prescribed manner, that is, at
attention. The commissar kept on
working quietly and let the officers
stand at attention for a long time.
When one became restless and began
to fidget, the commissar just looked
up and said, "You seem quite tired".
Then he asked, "Does anyone of the
gentlemen have anything to say about
the attack?" One officer replied
that the German resistance was too
strong, that attack at this position
was impossible. The commissar drew
his pistol, shot the officer, and
then simply asked, "Does anyone else
have any comments"? Half an hour
later, they carried out another
attack.
Look, that's an example of the kind
of bravery we don't want, and that
we don't need. The "commissar"
ordering us to attack must be our
own bravery, our own loyalty, our
own obedience. There is an enormous
difference.
In our ranks, we live according to
our Germanic laws, one of which, a
really beautiful one, says, "Honour
is compulsion enough." With foreign
peoples, we must apply Asiatic laws.
We must never lose sight of that. If
we have one of our blood before us,
a Norwegian or Dutchman of good
racial stock, then we can only win
his heart over to us according to
our, that means his and our, totally
Germanic laws. With a Russian or
Slav, from a racial point of view,
we should never even try to apply
our holy laws to them, but rather
the tried and tested laws of the
Russian commissar.
I would like to bring up another
issue here, which is part of the
topic of bravery. I mean civil
courage, which is sometimes not
quite as it should be. I know really
a lot of my best SS leaders, who
would storm any bunker, any fort,
unconsciously, automatically,
without thinking about it, but who,
if they had to demote a subordinate,
for example -- I think I already
mentioned this earlier in my remarks
-- they do this for me to see; but
then when the time for enforcement
comes, they act like astonished
Central Europeans and say, "Quite
incomprehensible, my dear fellow.
Dreadfully sorry. I'll have to speak
to Berlin about it right away.
Another piece of piggery from the
Main Staff Office. Of course, in
Berlin, it's all theory..." It would
be better to have civil courage
beforehand, and say, "You, you're
demoted, get out". No, gentlemen, it
doesn't work like that. In the
future -- I think I already said
this once -- I'll have to send all
such people back to the commander
involved and say: "Ah, that was your
mistake; the demotion was an error.
Now you get your valuable employee
back again". This is, in fact, an
element of bravery, so-called civil
courage. And I would like to educate
my leadership corps in it where it
is lacking.
Part of bravery also consists of
faith, and here, my Group Leaders,
we won't be outdone by anyone in the
world.
Faith wins battles, faith gets
victories. We don't want men in our
ranks who are pessimistic, who've
lost their faith. It doesn't make
any difference what his job is,
whether he's a member of the General
SS, in economic life, in a
government position, somewhere in
the Waffen SS, on the front (that
doesn't usually happen), or whether
he's on staff at the front, or
somewhere else in the communications
zone, in the homeland, in the
police, or in the Security Police or
Order Police. People who are so weak
that they've lost their faith will
be rejected by us, we don't want
them. He who has lost the strength
to believe shall not live among us
in our ranks.
4. Truthfulness
I come now to a fourth virtue, which
is very rare in Germany,
truthfulness. One of the greatest
evils, one which has become
widespread in the war, is
untruthfulness in communications,
reports, and data sent by
subordinate positions in civilian
life, in the state, party, and army,
to superior positions. The
communication, the report, is the
basis for every decision. It is
really true, that, in the war, one
can now assume in many sectors that
95 % of all reports are lies, or
only half-truths, or are only
half-correct.
This begins with troop strength
reports. I'll take an everyday
example. If somebody is asking for
reinforcements, he gives his
"fighting strength" as his "troop
strength". If he's even cleverer,
he'll give the "trench strength".
Of course, that's even less: "I have
only 200 men left". Frightful! Only
200 men.
If anybody is sly enough to say,
"What's your supply strength?" he'll
see that there are 1300 men eating
in the regiment concerned. I must
say: these are remarkable ratios.
Very odd. 200 men are fighting,
while 1100 men are the huge tail
wagging behind this little head. How
peculiar.
If somebody wants weapons, on the
other hand, he says, "I have a troop
strength of 3,000 men, but not
nearly enough weapons. I need
vehicles and weapons".
If somebody needs material, mines or
anti-tank cannons, for his
positions, then the position becomes
25, 30, 35 kilometres long. It
stretches out like a rubber band.
But if he's supposed to occupy it
and somebody says, "Your division is
so strong, you could occupy at least
25 kilometres", then the division
shrinks, and suddenly he says, "I
can only occupy 7 kilometres".
Then there are the famous
communications "on military
grounds". It used to be that when
somebody closed a Jewish company or
took away a Jew, a Mr. Paymaster So
and So reported, "What, do you want
to impair the defensive strength of
the German people? You're sabotaging
the war effort". In reality, the Jew
bought off the paymaster with a fur
coat. Today, if we take 800 Jewish
women away from a company, along
comes a gentleman and says -- so as
not to insult him, let's call him by
a title which doesn't even exist --
Mr. "War Advisor", who's just had a
pair of brand new boots made by the
company, and he says, "I must report
that you have seriously harmed war
production".
Or: sometimes, when I see proposals
for promotions and decorations,
there's no activity anywhere which
isn't decisive to the war effort.
It's astonishing. Look here. I
believe, if we want to be able to
look each other in the eye, we must
succeed in obtaining absolute and
unrestricted honesty. Otherwise,
management becomes impossible.
Nothing can be managed if, for
example, every Higher SS and Police
Leader, and every division and corps
commander, conceals 500 or 1000 men
from us. If 17 divisions each have
1000 men too many today, then the
German people are being deprived of
a division. If every division has
just 300 trucks too many per
division, then two divisions could
be motorized out of the surplus.
These are things we can't be
responsible for.
I now come to another matter on the
subject of truthfulness. In both war
and peace, it must be so -- and this
will be a particular object of
education in peacetime -- that we SS
men no longer need to make written
contracts; but rather, among us,
just as in former times, a man's
word and handshake must be
equivalent to a contract; an SS
Man's handshake, if necessary, must
be of greater value than a surety
for one million or more. The
handshake or given word of an SS
man, if necessary, must be
proverbially safer than a mortgage
on the most valuable property of
another man. It must be so!
If we make contracts, we must keep
them. If I make a contract with an
agent, even if he is a contemptible
character, then I keep the deal. I
stand for this attitude without
condition. When I decree that
anybody in the General Gouvernement
who informs on a Jew concealed in
some hideout gets one third of the
Jew's fortune, it often later
happens that a Secretary Hueber or
an Unterstuermführer Hueber, a
person who -- if he can get away
with it -- indulges in unauthorized
private travel, who orders anything
from a new pencil to a new
telephone, that is, somebody who
never saves, suddenly starts to save
for the German Reich. He says for
example, "The Jew has 12,000 RM. Why
should I give 4,000 RM to the Pole
who turned him in? No, I'll save the
money for Germany. The Pole gets 400
RM". In this manner, a subordinate
goes off on his own bat and breaks
the word of a whole organization.
These are things that must be
impossible.
If we give our word, it must be
kept. If the Reichsführer promises
somebody protection for his
organization -- as is often the case
in the Balkans -- then this promise
must be kept. We, precisely we of
the SS, must earn a reputation for
contractual loyalty all over the
world such as to gain the greatest
value for Germany in so doing, that
is, faith through trust. Many people
will then come to us who won't go to
official agencies. There's always a
lot of confusion in the Balkans.
That's really our big advantage. If
they were united, it would be
terrible. There's confusion in the
Caucasus, there's confusion in
Russia. We can only -- and that's
only part of the lesson -- take
constant care that the territories
occupied by us, and the peoples
governed by us, never unite, that
they remain disunited at all times:
if they united, they would, of
course, only be against us. So if we
promise protection to a splinter
group which comes to us, then it
must be out of the question for any
member of the SS or the police, that
is, the Order as a whole, to go and
break our given word. Our word must
be holy.
Justice! Gentlemen, it is always
very important to me that justice
must never be to the letter alone,
but unrestricted justice, in terms
of intent, not words or form. At the
same time, I'm coming to a matter
which is not quite right among us.
To our sorrow, as you know, many
regrettable legal matters come
before me in legal cases. I have
every judgement against a SS Leader
or police officer laid before me,
and sometimes I note the manner in
which my officers judge each other,
time after time. You know the
proverb of the crow that tried to
cover itself with another bird's
feathers...
It's such a habit for an officer not
to hurt another officer. Gentlemen,
Germany could learn from the old
Prussian army in this regard. An
organization remains healthy as long
as it feels an unwavering pressure,
an irresistible drive, to keep
itself clean. A corps must be
trained and educated to say to
someone who has done something wrong
"You must turn yourself in". Or, if
it's more serious: "You must be
punished for the sake of justice.
You don't belong here in our ranks,
or at least not in your present
position in our ranks. It's wartime;
you can go off and clear your name
by serving as a common enlisted man
and rise up through the ranks again.
But you don't belong in our ranks in
your present position". Now, instead
of this impulse -- one cannot really
call it by any other name -- to
cleanse one's own ranks, as was
still the custom in the old army
under Wilhelm I, an impulse to act
like a bunch of lawyers has spread
throughout all organizations in
Germany. There's no more talk of
cleansing, expelling, purging
anyone; rather, everybody is
somebody or other's else's lawyer;
it's like a trade union. Everybody
acts on the principle of: "Well, you
never know, you might do something
wrong yourself one day. So just be
careful! If you cover up for him,
he'll cover up for you".
It's a great setup. You can falsify
history like that for a while,
gentlemen; you can manipulate your
way upwards like a con-man. But one
day, when tough times come along and
there's pressure from Fate, then an
organization like that collapses
because of it. So I want you as
judges, and you as High Leadership
Corps of the SS, to ensure that such
things are no longer covered up. If
a little man and a big man are on
trial or involved in some legal
matter, I don't want to see the
little man get punished and then
hear people say of the big man, "He
was only marginally involved". Of
course, the officer is only
marginally involved. In a case like
that, you should say, "You have the
higher rank, therefore you have the
greater insight. Consequently, you
must be more strictly and severely
punished". It's the little man who
is marginally involved. If he hadn't
had his superior's example, he
wouldn't have done it.
There's another thing I want. I want
clear responsibility. That's another
element of truthfulness. I always
feel sick when I ask "Who decided
that?" and I get an answer like,
"Oh, the So and So Ministry Main
Office". So I say, "OK; and who,
pray tell, is Mr. Ministry?" That's
what I want to know. I was born that
way, I've got great curiosity. I
want to know which Untersturmführer,
Obersturmfueher, Hauptsturmführer,
Sturmbannführer was it? Who was it
in the Main Office? Was it Mr.
Meyer, or Mr. Huber? Who made the
decision?
Of course, a lot of people say,
"I've got a great boss, my Main
Office boss or my Higher SS and
Police Leader is a real good man.
Since he's so decent, he always
covers up for his subordinates". And
since all these little wretches look
so tremendously brave behind their
superior's back, they say, "The Old
Man will look out for us, he'll go
off like a big tiger and fight for
us before the Reichsführer". So I no
longer want to read that the "So and
So Main Office So and So has
decided"; rather, gentlemen, I want
to know whether it was Mr.
Sturmbannführer Meyer or Lehmann. If
the decision was correct, then he
can only be proud not to be just a
government employee someplace in the
background.
We don't want to see just the big
ones covering themselves in glory.
The little man should get some
glory, too.
Besides, there's also a really
positive side too. You and me, we'll
sometimes become alert to someone
who never attracted any attention at
all, who has never even been noticed
for all his hard work, and we'll be
able to say: "Damn! That was really
a great job! The report is concise,
but it means something. That man
must have eyes like a hawk. I'll
have to take a closer look at him".
We'll discover a lot of good brains
in our ranks this way; we'll be glad
to have opened the way for somebody
with talent, maybe sometimes even a
genius.
If a decision is wrong, though, then
I don't want the top-ranking
commandant to cover up a piece of
nonsense out of sheer frivolity and
maybe fight a battle to the death
with his comrade from another Main
Office or Upper Division, just
because he says: "It's our
jurisdiction. That the decision is
nonsense, makes no difference. If it
was my Main Office that made the
mistake, then it has to be
defended".
I also want us to act correctly with
regards to other offices, gentlemen.
I believe that I can say of myself
that when I go ahead, I set a good
example. If I'm wrong, I say so, I'm
wrong. My God, our authority can't
be so small-minded that we can't
admit that. We all have so damn much
work to do, that out of one hundred
decisions a certain percentage of
wrong, badly thought out, or
half-baked decisions must be made.
That's human. I'd rather have the
work get done, and the decisions be
made; rather than one man making
five perfectly correct decisions,
I'd rather have somebody else make
one hundred decisions in the same
period of time, of which five may be
wrong; since the other 95 are still
correct. Since mistakes may be made,
I admit them; I don't defend
nonsense "for the sake of Germany".
You say: "Yes, we made a mistake.
That will be improved or corrected,
without any loss of our prestige".
That's how it's got to be with us;
and we want to go ahead and set a
good example. I've also given orders
to this effect in the Ministry. The
individual should stand forward by
name; we're not a joint-stock
company. Because of the Jews, it
became a habit with us to do all
business in the form of joint-stock
companies; but nobody knew who the
joint- stock company was, or which
Jew was "Mr. Ltd." or "Mr. Inc.". I
don't want a "Mr. Ministry", but I
do want administrative advisors,
secretaries, etc., and, among us, I
want SS Leaders, Untersturmfuehers,
or Obersturmführers, or maybe even a
Standartenführer, if he's clever
enough. But I want to know them all
by name.
So let's all start doing that. We
want to eliminate anonymity, and
substitute clear responsibility.
Whatever I do, I am responsible for
it: we must educate even the
lowest-ranking Unterscharführer to
this, but we must start with the
higher leadership.
5) Honesty
I now come to a fifth point:
sanctity of property, honesty,
sincerity. I must say that these
things have gotten very murky in
Germany; we have become -- if I say
this now in a closed room, it's
because it's only intended for this
small group of people -- a very
corrupt people. We should not, and
need not, however -- I want to
mention this -- take it so
tragically, so pessimistically. Many
people say, "Oh, the Finns are an
honest people". Yes sir. Do you know
why they're so honest? Not because
they've got simply fantastic moral
inclinations, but because they had
laws for 300 years, that anybody who
stole one Finnish mark should have
his hand hacked off. And that was so
painful and so distressing that the
whole people, as a result of such
measures and such education,
gradually became honest. We're not
going to start doing that here, but,
gentlemen, we must always take care
to begin with ourselves. We will
never succeed in bringing the
pestilence called corruption under
control, not even within our own
ranks -- it's not so bad yet --
unless we persecute all signs of
incipient corruption in our ranks
without exception and without
restriction, without asking "Who is
it?", and without saying "But...
but...". We must persecute them with
barbarous severity, demoting all
corrupt men, depriving them of
office and decorations, and exposing
them before their subordinates.
At the same time, that which really
deserves the name of corruption is
not so bad in our ranks. There are,
however, little things that nobody
notices any more and which are now
called "getting something
organized". For example, a family
lives in the East. They've got more
than enough workers already. They
grab this Russian, that Russian,
maybe a Russian girl. That's
terrific, really magnificent. The
missus doesn't have to do anything
any more, she no longer cooks or
beats carpets. What for? We're a
master race. Nobody asks who pays
for these workers; they'd be better
utilized in an armaments factory.
For a while, at first, before
Obergruppenführer Pohl got them --
Eicke had already gone into front
line service -- this was true even
in the concentration camps, due to
the confused relationships of
authority. A lot of families had a
prisoner here, and a prisoner there;
other families even got all new
furniture and I don't know what all
else. We've still got old cases
pending, and we're going to clear
these old cases up, right down to
the last detail, without mercy.
Because it's stealing to claim
workers to which one is not
entitled, when the work isn't really
a necessity of life. 100 men used
solely on the grounds of comfort in
such work today, are a loss for
German armaments.
In addition to what I've already
said, however, confusion arises with
regard to this question because of
the misery in which we have been
living since 1936-1937 [!?]. Since
that time, we no longer have all the
necessary consumer goods which the
human heart desires, and which we
would like to have, such as silk,
stockings, chocolate, or coffee.
[Translator's note: See also famous
forgery Document L-3, in which
Germany's economic problems (in
1939!) were to be solved by
attacking poverty-stricken Poland.]
Hazy conditions are the result. We
don't want to be hangmen here.
There's a lot of temptation: can you
buy it, can't you, maybe you can get
it in France, or Belgium, or
someplace else if you pay extra.
These are things which make
education difficult, of course. So
I'm not concerning myself with all
these moot questions which many
people take for granted in this
epoch of misery. I'm simply saying
today that that the strictest
conceivable standards will be
established for the SS the moment
normal conditions are restored after
the war. If we do that for 20 years
in peacetime, we'll achieve a
faultless attitude on all these
matters in the future through
education.
I'd like to mention one more thing.
To me, it's obvious that the old
fighters, the longer they have
fought for the movement, the greater
is their duty to act decently in all
things. When somebody comes to me
and says, "But he's an old fighter",
then I must answer, "Mister, please
excuse me, but did we really fight
for the Third Reich just so we could
wreck [veb: "totschlagen"] it
ourselves, destroying [verb:
"umbringen"] through violence the
respect that the people once had for
us?"
It is precisely the old Nazi who,
when he slips, must be caught and
punished; who, in really serious
cases, must pay with his life. We
can take no account of past service.
If we punish him, and the others
talk about it, we save 99 others.
But if we look the other way,
saying, "He's an old Nazi", "He's an
old SS Leader, you can't sentence
leaders", then the next 99 will be
guilty in the same case, and the
whole organization will gradually
suffocate because of it.
6) Comradeship
The word "comradeship" is used with
great frequency. Comradeship is
generally quite good among us,
especially among the front line
troops. I would, however, since I am
speaking of comradeship, like to all
one thing: avoid any disputes
amongst yourselves. Disputes are
unproductive.
Differences of opinion are
productive, if they are managed
factually. Disputes, rancour, anger,
and backbiting are unproductive, and
paralyse the strength which we owe
the Fatherland. They cost nervous
energy which we need for other
things, namely, for the fulfillment
of our duties.
I must perhaps make another request,
that disputes between higher leaders
not be carried out at my expense. In
many cases, the Reichsführer has to
play postman, since the two
gentlemen are no longer speaking to
each other.
So one of them writes a letter to
the Reichsführer SS, then the other
one writes a letter, too. Then the
Reichsführer has to write to both of
them, and so on. It would save
stamps, and be much simpler, it
would save us all time, if the
gentlemen would write to each other,
and sit down together for once. In
most cases, almost all cases, it
turns out that if they speak their
mind, if they take the time to
discuss it, the matter is settled.
If they don't take the time for it,
if one says, "I don't have time, I
can't see him this afternoon,
besides, we can't agree on whether
he visits me or I visit him, let's
meet someplace neutral, the best
thing is to meet by an old oak tree,
or something like that". If they
can't reach an agreement like that,
since these are all matters of
prestige -- a man has his prestige
after all, especially when his
person is involved -- then they can
never even discuss the matter.
But then they write letters to each
other for weeks and weeks, months
and years, just to get mad every
time and wait for the other man to
do something. Then some little
wretch comes along and says, "I've
got a real great number with my Old
Man, if I tell him the other guy was
naughty again, he'll say: he's
representing my interests, he's a
good Unterstuermführer, he's in the
right."
I'd like to tell you something:
beware of such subordinates, beware
of such companions. Let us all
beware of men who kindle disputes
and don't advise reconciliation
between German people. Everybody who
decorates himself with cheap laurels
in this manner, as especially brave
representatives of their Ministry,
their section, their division, would
best be removed from office
immediately for encouraging
quarrelsomeness and character
defects.
These are things -- I would like to
draw your attention to this -- that
we want to eradicate [verb:
"ausmerzen"] from our entire
Leadership Corps.
7) Responsibility
I have already briefly spoken on the
subject of willingness to take
responsibility. Situations will
arise in this war requiring
tremendous willingness to take
responsibility. At this point, I'm
not thinking of what I said before,
that responsibility must be clearly
stated, that the individual must
stand up and be counted instead of
remaining anonymous; rather, I am
now thinking of another kind of
responsibility, namely, a
willingness to take responsibility
even when, gentlemen, it really has
nothing to do with you. I would like
to say something here about the
famous matter of jurisdiction. Our
friend Obergruppenführer Wolff, in
Italy, has just introduced something
in the local Italian office: he
said, "The man with jurisdiction is
the man who can get it done." That's
really true. In particular, there
are men who say, "Of course, I'm
responsible for that, but I can't
get along with the person I have to
deal with, he doesn't like me, he
turns me down. So I'd rather see
that nothing gets done in this
matter."
Somebody else who isn't competent,
of course, could certainly get
something done, because he's friends
with the man on the other end. But
he's not allowed to negotiate. The
man with the authority would rather
do nothing for the SS than see
something get done by somebody who
doesn't have the authority. I think
you understand what I mean. Look, we
must be generous here, right up to
the hilt. The main thing is,
something's got to be done. It's the
same thing in battle: if an
important hill has to be taken, it
doesn't matter whether the 995th
Division or the 998th has authority
to do it. The main thing is, it has
to be taken; then afterwards, they
can always say, "OK, it's in your
sector now; of course, we took it,
but please be so kind as to occupy
and hold it; don't let it be taken
away again, or else we'll have to
take it again".
That which must be accomplished for
Germany and for the SS must be
accomplished by the person who is
able to do it, whoever can get it
done, and that person must possess
an uttermost love of responsibility.
8) Hard work
I would like to say another word
about hard work. Lets teach all our
men, today during the war and later
in peacetime, that no work is
undignified. It often happens that,
as soon as one becomes, let's say,
an Unterscharführer, of course, he
can't carry suitcases any more, he
can't do this and he can't do that
any more. He can only stand around
and supervise. That's the way it is
now.
For example, if a leader goes out
with his wife, of course, he can't
carry a package in uniform; it's
better to let his wife do it. It's
almost like in the Orient with us.
Maybe we should make it a law that
the wife with the package should
also walk three steps behind. These
attitudes have already become really
traditional, and I don't want to see
them adopted by us. I would like us
to issue a motto for us, namely
this, that for men and women of this
Order, this racial community of the
SS, the word "work" will be writ
large; that no work done for Germany
is shameful, be it with axe or spade
or with the pen, whether in
agriculture, in the home or factory,
or whether with the sword or plough.
I am of the heretical opinion that
we will be a poor people after the
war, thank God. I find that
downright encouraging. If we were
really rich and well-off, we would
probably not last long. We would
collapse from sheer megalomania. We
wouldn't know whether we were coming
or going from sheer conceit. Because
the war costs a lot of money, and
because we must finance everything
ourselves, I therefore truly believe
that we will be a poor people. We
will therefore have to work again.
Above all, we must keep people from
saying: "Servant girl, oh, no, no
German girl can do that, that's for
foreigners". We would end up like
the ancient Romans, bringing over
slave nationalities by whom we would
be racially contaminated.
These are some of the great problems
which are already weighing down upon
me and which concern me more than a
lot of things in this war. The war
must be carried on to the end; we'll
win it after all, we just don't need
to make mistakes. The other
questions, however, winning the
peace, winning over people's hearts
again, letting them relax again
after the war, and then getting them
back to work immediately, educating
them; these questions will be much
more difficult at times. I believe,
as I said, that the German people,
at the end of the war, will be, not
pauperized, but poor; that we will
have to be very productive and work
very hard. I hope we won't be so
rich that we can only gobble meat
until our teeth fall out, and commit
other acts of nutritional stupidity;
but rather, that all these things
will be regulated by life itself.
I also believe that the evils of the
bombing war will lead to a
dispersion of the great cities, so
that we will be driven out onto the
land a bit by our gracious God. Many
people will then say: "It's not so
bad on the land at all; I've got a
goat, somebody else has a pig, we've
got a few potatoes." That would be a
very good start. Besides, we won't
suffer so many hard blows. That's
really good for the immediate
future. We would never have been
willing to spend the money required
to tear down the cities. Now they've
been torn down by Fate, and we will
probably rebuild them more
rationally with more open spaces.
We must recognize these things in
time, and apply education correctly
from the outset. When you, as
commanders, discover childish
military vices such as an
Unterscharführer thinking that he
doesn't have to work, then you must
intervene. Sometimes it goes so far
-- not, thank God in our divisions
-- that soldiers no longer dig in.
They seem to think: a Master Race
doesn't dig in. It allows itself to
be killed, but it doesn't dig in. I
want these things to be eradicated
["ausgerottet werden"] as radically
as possible among us, so that they
cease to be a habit.
9) Avoidance of alcohol
We really need waste no words on the
subject of alcohol, we know that.
With the hundreds of thousands of
men that we're losing in the war, we
can't afford to lose still more men,
physically or morally, through
addiction to alcohol and
self-destruction. Here as well, the
best comradeship which you can
extend to your subordinates is the
greatest, most merciless severity.
Crimes committed under the influence
of alcohol must be punished twice as
severely. Leaders who allow their
subordinates to hold drinking
parties in their companies will be
punished. I must request that this
be carried out everywhere.
Practical tasks
Now to the practical tasks, and then
I will finish. Beginning with
myself, I already told you that, in
the Reichsministry of the Interior,
I see the practical work before us
as consisting of strengthening the
authority of the Reich, and in
defending domestic morale and
conduct. In the field of the Waffen
SS, the main thing is to train
leaders and Unterführers in
sufficient numbers for the purpose
of new formations, since I see that
we will have to intervene on an
increasing basis among foreign
nationalities. We will therefore
need Leaders and Unterführers.
These new formations will be the
responsibility of the SS Main Office
during the initial recruiting stage;
during the second stage of training
and armaments, they will be the
responsibility of the SS Leadership
Main Office.
Another task, of particular concern
to our Obergruppenführer Pohl, will
be the increasing and strengthening
of our armaments works and armaments
efforts; the task of the Order
Police will to mop up the East,
since the reduction in territory
involved will release gendarmerie
and staff strengths, even if we only
cover the territory using the
present strengths. The main thing is
to mop up mercilessly, completely.
Many will weep, but that doesn't
matter; there is a lot of weeping
already. We must economize on
strength, since we will need
intervention reserves here and there
in this troubled Europe. The work of
the Security Police will increase in
significance, since the war of
nerves, of psychological warfare,
will reach a climax in the fifth and
sixth year of the war.
For the Higher SS and Police
Leaders, in terms of practical
tasks, I see a task which also
applies in particular to the Main
Office. To me, the Higher SS and
Police Leader is the representative
of the Reichsführer SS in his
sector. Woe, if the SS and Police
ever have a falling out. Woe, if the
Main Offices ever become independent
from each other with regards to
their subordinates through well a
well-intended, but incorrect, notion
of their responsibilities, each with
its own hierarchy of authority.
That would, I firmly believe, be the
end of the SS, if anybody ever
shoots me out of hand. It must and
shall be, that this Order of the SS,
with all its great sectors -- the
whole basis of the Allgemeine SS,
Order Police, Security Police,
general economic management,
training, ideological education, the
whole genealogical question -- shall
form one block, one body, one order,
even under the decimated
Reichsfuehers SS. Woe, if we fail to
bring that about. Woe, if the
individual Main offices, the
individual chiefs, ever get a false
idea of their tasks here; if they
believe they are doing good, when in
reality they are taking the first
step towards ruin. We have come a
long way on the path towards fusion.
In the bitterest hours of the hard
struggle of this year, the Waffen SS
was merged together from the most
diverse divisions and units, out of
which it formed the Leibstandarte,
the reserves, Death's Head units,
and finally the Germanic SS. When
our Divisions "Das Reich", "Death's
Head", Cavalry and "Viking" fought
together just recently, everyone
knew, especially in the past few
weeks: "The 'Viking' is with me, the
'Reich' is with me, the 'Death's
Head' is with me"; nothing can
happen to us, thank God."
The Order Police and Security
Police, the Allgemeine SS, and
Waffen SS must now gradually merge,
as it is and must be within the
Waffen SS. This is already happening
in the area of appointments to
office, recruiting, training,
economic affairs, and medical
treatment. I'm always doing
something to accomplish this
purpose; over and over again, a band
is being wrapped around this bundle
of shoots, to allow it to grow
together.
Woe, if these bands should ever
loosen, since everything -- you may
well believe it -- would sink back
into its old meaninglessness in a
generation, in the shortest period
of time. One could then say: that
wouldn't be a shame; if it is
incapable of living, let it die.
That is true. Nor would I ever wish
to keep anything alive, even my --
our -- SS, which is so dear to us,
if it is incapable of living. I
simply believe, however, that we
could not bear responsibility for it
before Germany, before the Germanic
world; because this Germanic Reich
needs the Order of the SS. It will
need it for at least the next few
centuries. Another form for it will
certainly be found in one hundred, a
thousand, two thousand years. When
we're finished, some remnant will be
saved and maintained by us, together
with a few basic ideas. Something
new will arise from that remnant,
just as we held out our hand to
grasp the torch held out to us, here
and there, from the age of the
Germanic tribes, from the age of
chivalry, from the Vehmic
organizations [Translator's note:
secret medieval courts similar to
American vigilante committees;
anti-French resistance organizations
under the occupation of the
Rhineland], from the Prussian army;
we are now the bearers of that
torch, for the purpose of kindling a
great Light. Thus shall it be in
later times. Today, I believe, we
cannot afford to anything happen to
this SS. I therefore urge one thing
to you all, you, my Main Office
Chiefs, my Higher SS and Police
Leaders, to the entire corps of
Group Leader, to the highest level
of hierarchy of the Order of the SS:
always look at the whole, always see
the Order as a whole, never just
look at your own sector, never just
look at your own Upper Section, but
always look at the SS, and above
that, the Germanic Reich, and above
that, our führer, who created this
Reich and who is still creating it.
Party and army
Unity, which is more important than
ever in Germany today, must be a
Sacred Commandment to us, even if we
may get angry over something or
other once in a while. We need
complete unity with the Party and
with all its institutions.
Fortunately, unity with the SA
already exists. The new Chief of
Staff Schepmann also views the
creation of peace and harmony
between old Party organizations as
his most important task. We need
unity with the armed forces. We know
that, as political soldiers, we
think that many things in various
units of the armed forces are out of
date, unattractive, or incorrect.
Always look at the positive;
consider it your task to win men
over; be a missionary. Don't look at
the negative; don't look at what you
don't like, but try to win men over
who are often thirsting for a
message. Try to make them understand
the meaning of the war, and of the
tasks that you are carrying out.
Teach them about the racial
question. We are, after all,
fortunate enough to be able to say
that we know all about that. That is
what gives us our strength, that
which makes us invulnerable to
crisis. Take the trouble to
communicate and propagate these
thoughts. Every company chief to
whom you communicate our ideas will
become stronger, and his company
will become stronger. Every division
commander not rejected or insulted
by you, but rather won over, will be
a relentlessly uncompromising
fighter in this war, with
15,000-20,000 men behind him. That
means he'll hold the front; because
it's the heart that holds the front;
not the body, not the weapons, not
the cannons.
SS Helferinnen "female auxiliaries"
There is another point I want to
mention here. We have already
thinned our ranks very seriously.
Where we can still spare a man, we
want him out. After long hesitation,
I have agreed that SS
Obergruppenführer Sachs, who came to
me with this plan, should create a
school for SS Helferinnen in
Oberehnheim. I must say that this
newest SS institution of the SS is
also making very good progress so
far. I have set myself the task in
this respect of creating a form
which was neither an institution for
clerks, nor one for merry-making.
The German people, with all its
values, must after all succeed in
calling into being an institution
similar to the Finnish Lottas. We
must attempt to achieve -- through a
selection of these girls, so that
truly the most valuable will come to
us, as well as through an awakening
of their feeling of honour -- that
which cannot be achieved through
compulsion, not through curfews,
punishments, and all other kinds of
compulsion.
In this connection, gentlemen
Obergruppenführer and Gruppenführer,
it is your job, each of you, to make
an effort to send us every valuable
young girl of your acquaintance or
from among your blood relatives,
just as we used to recruit men for
the Waffen SS and Junkers for the
Leader career. Our comrade and
friend Waldeck has behaved ideally
in this regard, and has sent us his
daughter. He is now going to send us
his second daughter.
The Upper Section which has helped
the most in this new area has been
Hoffmann's Upper Section Southwest.
This will help us achieve one thing:
every girl that we can use, will
replace one man. A bit of nonsense
occurred in one office, since
soldiers and SS Men are, after all,
very stubborn. There, the commander
said: "I'll let these girls train SS
Men as communications assistants in
the communications service, then
I'll send the girls away; I don't
want girls in my unit". That is, of
course, not really the purpose of
the institution; rather, the purpose
is the other way around, to use the
girls to replace the men. But I
think that generally that will all
be straightened out. I am now asking
you to treat these girls with all
your chivalry, all your sense of
justice, all your concern; take care
that this institution remains
sacred; act with all the nobility
which, in other respects, really
exists in our ranks. I don't want
any jokes here; these are our
daughters; they're the sisters of SS
Men, and are intended to be the
brides of younger SS Men and
Leaders.
When I met these girls, I said that
when a man wants to marry one of
them and he finds out she was an SS
Helferin, he mustn't say: "No, for
God's sake, it's out of the
question". Rather, when a man wants
to marry one of them and he finds
out she was an SS Helferin, he must
say, "Yes, I can marry her, she's
all right". That's how it must be.
That is how the girls must behave;
that is how you commanders must look
out for them, and enforce this
attitude with regards to your
subordinates.
The future
The immediate future will, I
believe, bring very heavy burdens;
we will have a hard winter, a hard
early year, before us. The assault
in the East will be bitter as never
before. The partisan war will
increase. As soon as the thaw
permits, landings and air attacks by
the English and Americans will
increase as well. This winter, the
motto must be: "Stand, resist, have
faith, hit back, fight, never give
in". That is the main thing.
Whatever it takes to end the war and
achieve victory, one thing must be
clear in our minds at all times: a
war must first be won spiritually,
in terms of will and soul; after
that, physical, bodily, material
victory is only a result.
Only he who capitulates, only he who
says, "I've lost my faith, my will
to resist", can lose; because he has
laid down his weapons. He who fights
and resists stubbornly, until an
hour past the conclusion of peace,
has won. We need all the stubborness
we possess, all the obduracy that
distinguishes us so absolutely; all
our tenacity, all our obstinacy, all
our pig-headedness. We want to show
the English, the Americans, and the
Russian sub-humans that we are
tougher; that we, precisely we, the
SS, will be those who stand forever.
We wish to be the ones who return to
fight again and again, whenever the
opportunity arises, even in the 5th
and 6th years of the war, with good
humour; not with faces as bitter as
the dead, but with humour, will, and
drive. If we do that, many others
will follow our example, and will
stand as well. In the last analysis,
we must have the will, and we have
it, cooly and soberly to kill
["umbringen"] anyone who, in any
position, no longer wishes to go on
fighting in Germany -- that can
happen under stress. It is better to
put a certain number up against the
wall than to allow a breach to be
opened anywhere in our lines. If we
are prepared spiritually, in terms
of will and intellect, then we will
win the war according to the laws of
history and of nature; because we
incorporate the higher human values,
the higher, more powerful values of
nature.
As I said already, our work will
begin after we've won the war. We
don't know when the war will be
over. It can happen suddenly, it can
take a long time. We'll see when it
happens. But I am already predicting
to you today, when armistice and
peace suddenly come along, let no
one believe that he can simply fall
back and sleep the sleep of the
just. Make sure all your commanders,
chiefs, and SS Leaders understand
this: because, gentlemen, if we once
relax, a great many others will fall
into the same sleep as well. I'm
going to wake up the SS so
thoroughly, and keep it so wide
awake, that we can go straight to
work building Germany. The Germanic
work will then begin immediately in
the Allgemeine SS; the harvest is
ripe, and ready to be carried to the
granery. We'll recruit the young by
conscription. We'll put all our
Waffen SS units in top shape in
terms of armaments and training. For
the first half year after the war,
we'll work as if the big attack were
coming the very next day. It will be
decisive for Germany to have an
operative reserve of 20, 25, or 30
intact SS divisions at the
negotiations for peace or an
armistice.
When the final peace comes, then
we'll be ready to proceed with our
great work of the future. We will
colonize; we will educate the young
in the laws of the Order of the SS.
I consider it absolutely crucial to
the life of our people that concepts
such as "ancestors", "grandchildren"
and "future" not be taught as
external matters, but that they
become a part of our being. It must
be a matter of course for us to have
children, without question, without
the need for offer premiums and
material incentives. It must be a
matter of course that the greatest
number of descendents should issue
from this Order, from this, the
racial upper stratum of the Germanic
people. We must be truly capable of
supplying the leadership stratum for
all of Europe in 20 or 30 years. If
the SS, together with the farmers,
if we, together with out friend
Backe, then colonize the East, in
bold strokes, without inhibition,
not inquiring about traditional
methods, with revolutionary drive
and impetus, then we'll be able to
extend the racial borders of the
Reich by 500 kilometres to the East
in 20 years.
I asked the Führer today to grant
the SS -- if we fulfill our tasks
and duties until the end of the war
-- the privilege of maintaining the
outermost German border to the East
in a military sense. I believe this
is the only privilege in which we
need fear no competition. I don't
believe that anyone will dispute us
this privilege. There, we will be
able to train every age group in the
practical use of weapons. We will
dictate our laws to the East. We
shall burst forth and press
gradually onwards to the Urals. I
hope that our generation succeeds in
enabling every age group to fight in
the East, so that every divisions
spends a winter in the East every
two or three years. Then we'll never
grow soft; we'll never have
uniform-bearers who only come to us
because it's comfortable, because
the black uniform naturally looks
very attractive during peacetime.
Everybody will know that if he joins
the SS, there will always be a
possibility of getting killed. He'll
know he won't be dancing in Berlin
or celebrating Carnival in Munich
every other year; rather, he'll be
stationed on the Eastern border in
an ice cold winter. This will ensure
us a healthy selection for all time.
This will enable us to create the
preconditions for the entire
Germanic people and for all of
Europe, led, ordered, and trained by
us, the Germanic people, over
generations, to resist the fateful
struggle with an Asia certain to
break forth once again.
We don't know when that will be.
When the "mass man" arises on the
other side with 1 to 1.5 billion
people, then the Germanic people
with its, I hope, 250 to 300 million
people, together with the other
European peoples, for a total of 600
to 700 million people, on a
perimeter extending the Urals, or,
in one hundred years, extending over
the Urals, will carry on its battle
for life against Asia. Woe, if the
Germanic people should fail to
resist in this struggle.
That would be the end of beauty and
culture, of the creative power of
this earth. That is the distant
future.
That is what we are fighting for: it
is our duty to pass on the heritage
of our ancestors.
We see into the future because we
know the future. That is why we do
our duty more fanatically than ever,
with greater faith than ever before,
more bravely, more obediently, more
decently than ever before. We want
to be worthy of being the Führer
Adolf Hitler's first SS Men in the
long history of the Germanic people,
a history which stands before us.
Now let us honour the Führer, our
Führer Adolf Hitler, who created the
Germanic Reich, and who will lead us
into the Germanic future.
Our Führer Adolf Hitler
Sieg heil!
Sieg heil!
Sieg heil!
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